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Our Campaign Finance Nationalism 
Eugene D. Mazo* 
Abstract 
 
Campaign finance is the one area of election law that is most difficult to 
square with federalism.  While voting has a strong federalism component—
elections are run by the states and our elected officials represent concrete geo-
graphical districts—our campaign finance system, which is rooted in the First 
Amendment, almost entirely sidesteps the boundaries of American federalism.  
In so doing, our campaign finance system creates a tenuous connection between 
a lawmaker’s constituents, or the people who elect him, and the contributors 
who provide the majority of his campaign cash.  The recent explosion of outside 
spending in American elections by wealthy individuals and Super PACs has fur-
ther eroded the relationship between campaign finance and election law federal-
ism.  Indeed, today the restrictions placed on campaign finance are not federal 
at all, but rather national: only foreign nationals cannot make contributions or 
expenditures to influence federal, state, or local elections in the United States.  
However, these restrictions barring foreign nationals from participating in our 
elections suffer from several doctrinal inconsistencies, and, as the 2016 election 
showed, they are also hard to police in practice.  This Article explores the rela-
tionship between our election law federalism and our campaign finance nation-
alism.  It explains the difficulties that the states and the federal government have 
encountered when they have tried to regulate campaign finance at the border by 
restricting how outside money is spent to influence our elections. 
  
 
 * Eugene D. Mazo is visiting associate professor of law at Rutgers Law School.  He thanks 
Professors Derek Muller and Victoria Schwartz for encouraging him to write about this topic; Pro-
fessor Anthony Gaughan for providing helpful comments on an earlier draft; Caroline Young for 
designing the charts and graphs; Brian Carey and Lucy Martin for superb research assistance; and 
Colten Stanberry and the editors of the Pepperdine Law Review for their thoughtful editing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in a country with a bifurcated electoral system.  On one hand, 
our federal and state officials are chosen from distinct geographical districts, 
and only residents of those districts may vote for these officials.  Only a res-
ident of New Jersey, for instance, may cast a vote for the candidate running 
to represent New Jersey in the U.S. Senate.  Likewise, only a resident of 
California’s 45th Congressional District may cast a vote for the candidate 
running to represent that district in the U.S. House of Representatives.  On 
the other hand, a resident of Iowa can contribute money to either of these 
candidates.1  The Iowan can contribute the same amount to the candidate 
running for Senate in New Jersey as he can to the candidate running for 
Congress in California, despite the fact that he may vote for neither of them.2  
The bifurcated nature of this system, in which a politician’s contributors are 
often geographically disaggregated from his bounded constituents, has be-
come one of the hallmarks of modern politics in the United States.3 
The reason our system functions this way is because the law views vot-
ing and campaigning as distinct activities.4  Each activity is governed by its 
own body of law.5  For the most part, voting is governed by state law.6  State 
law dictates who qualifies to vote, how a person who is qualified to vote 
 
 1.  Eugene D. Mazo, The Disappearance of Corruption and the New Path Forward in Cam-
paign Finance, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 305 n.213 (2014) (“[O]ut-of-state residents 
are allowed to influence elections in states that are not their own by sending campaign contributions 
to politicians across state borders, . . . but they are not allowed to vote in these states’ elections . . . 
.”). 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  See David Fontana, The Geography of Campaign Finance Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 
1263 (2017) (“Those with the resources to contribute at meaningful rates and in meaningful amounts 
reside in a very small number of neighborhoods in a very small number of metropolitan areas.  Cam-
paign finance law permits and even privileges their contributions to congressional elections . . . .”); 
see also Anne Baker, The More Outside Money Politicians Take, The Less Well They Represent 
Their Constituents, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/08/17/members-of-congress-follow-the-money-not-the-voters-heres-the-evidence/ 
(“About a quarter of the members of the House of Representatives raise a larger share of their cam-
paign funds from donors outside of their districts.”). 
 4.  See Voting and Election Laws, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/voting-laws (last visited Mar. 
16, 2019) (describing voting laws and campaign finance laws as distinct and governed by separate 
bodies of law). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See NCSL’s Elections Resources, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 25, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-laws-and-procedures-overview.aspx 
(compiling individual state regulations for a variety of voting issues, such as voter registration, pro-
visional ballots, and voter identification laws). 
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goes about registering to vote, and how someone who is registered to vote 
may be disqualified from voting.  State law also restricts voting in state and 
local elections to a state’s citizens or residents.  Because state law regulates 
voting differently from state to state, the laws that enable voting are em-
blematic of America’s election law federalism.7  By contrast, the law that 
governs campaigning and spending money on elections is national in scope.8  
A major portion of this law involves the doctrines of free speech and free-
dom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment.9  Since the First 
Amendment applies to every person equally, our campaign finance jurispru-
dence largely ignores the federalism of voting.10  Minors under the age of 
eighteen, incarcerated prisoners, corporations, unions, political parties, and 
political action committees cannot vote, yet they each have the ability to in-
fluence our federal, state, and local elections with their checkbooks.11 
This bifurcation of our voting rights federalism and campaign finance 
nationalism dictates how elections are run in the United States.  Candidates 
must appeal to the voters of distinct geographic districts, even when the 
money they use to do so comes from the far-flung corners of country.12  The 
interplay between our state laws on voting and the First Amendment’s pro-
tections for campaigning provide the recipe for this state of affairs.13  But 
when a foreign citizen wishes to influence an election in the United States, 
such as by making a contribution or expenditure to support a candidate for 
office, the purity of the First Amendment crumbles and the law prevents him 
from doing so.14  The same First Amendment protections that make our 
campaign finance system national in scope do not also extend to make it in-
 
 7. See infra Section II.A (describing voting as a “state’s rights issue”); see also Derek Muller, 
Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (explaining that 
each state administers its own elections and determines its own voters’ eligibility). 
 8.  See Voting and Election Laws, supra note 4.  
 9.  See Richard Briffault, Of Constituents and Contributors, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 29, 53–54 
(2015) (explaining how “[t]he Supreme Court has protected the right of minors too young to vote to 
make contributions to candidates and political parties, as well as the rights of corporations ineligible 
to vote to make campaign expenditures”).  
 10.  See id. at 54–55. 
 11.  See id. 
 12.  See Mazo, supra note 1, at 305 n.213. 
 13.  See Briffault, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
 14.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30121; see also “Foreign” Campaign Contributions and the First Amend-
ment, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1886, 1888 (1997) (explaining how “current law forbids ‘foreign nation-
als’ from making contributions or expenditures in connection with federal, state, or local elec-
tions.”). 
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ternational.  The reason this is so, the courts have said, is because foreigners 
are not members of the same political community.15 
A number of prominent commentators have criticized this doctrinal dis-
tinction, pointing out its inconsistencies in light of the robust view of the 
First Amendment articulated in Citizens United v. FEC16 and other recent 
campaign finance cases.17  To be sure, these commentators do not want for-
eigners to participate in American elections, but they argue the Supreme 
Court has created a campaign finance system that makes it very difficult to 
police various kinds of foreign participation.18  Citizens United may have of-
fered a vigorous view of the First Amendment, but that case failed to articu-
late the proper boundaries of our campaign finance system.19  Instead, these 
boundaries have been dictated by a lower court decision in another case, 
Bluman v. FEC.20  Several years after Bluman was decided, the Russian 
 
 15.  See, e.g., Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) 
(explaining how “[i]t is fundamental to the definition of our national political community that for-
eign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in . . . activities of democratic self-
government,” and, as such, that “the United States has a compelling interest for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American demo-
cratic self-government” by restricting their political contributions and express advocacy expendi-
tures); see also Deborah Hellman, Liberty, Equality, Bribery, and Self-Government: Reframing the 
Campaign Finance Debate, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN 
AMERICA 66 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018) (explaining how there is a line of 
cases restricting foreigners from participating in activities such as voting, serving on juries, or work-
ing as police or probation officers because they are not members of the political community).  
 16. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 17.  See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011).  Professor Richard Hasen has been one of the most outspoken 
commentators against our current campaign finance doctrine and the way it applies to foreigners.  
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
584 (2011) (arguing that “it is unclear how, if the Court took its own broad pronouncements in Citi-
zens United seriously, it could possibly sustain spending limits against foreign nationals and gov-
ernments”). 
 18.  See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 15–25 (2016) (criticizing Citizens United and 
questioning how its view of the First Amendment could possibly restrict foreign contributions).  
 19.  See Hasen, supra note 17, at 581 (arguing that while the Supreme Court “harmonized cam-
paign finance law on the question of the constitutionality of spending limits on corporations,” it 
“amplified and solidified other significant, incoherent aspects of its campaign finance jurispru-
dence”). 
 20.  See Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 281.  See also Anthony J. Gaughan, Trump, Twitter, and the 
Russians: The Growing Obsolescence of Federal Campaign Finance Law, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 79, 107 (2017) (describing how the 2016 election should inspire reform of our federal campaign 
finance laws); Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate Inter-
national Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579 (2017) (exploring whether Russia’s actions in 2016 violated 
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government’s aggressive actions during the presidential election of 2016 re-
vealed the limits of our campaign finance nationalism and demonstrated the 
difficulty of policing these boundaries in practice.21  Russia’s actions offered 
an example of how it may be only a matter of time before events beyond the 
control of the courts lead to a public reckoning.22 
This Article explores the national aspects of our campaign finance sys-
tem.  Part II reviews the literature on election law federalism and explains 
how campaign finance, which is largely regulated under the First Amend-
ment, does not easily fit within it.23  Part III chronicles the history, structure, 
and contours of America’s campaign finance nationalism.24  It explores the 
origins of the prohibition on foreigners from making contributions or ex-
penditures to influence American elections,25 and it examines the important 
decision in Bluman,26 which forms the linchpin of this prohibition.27  Part IV 
looks at the consequences of our campaign finance nationalism.28  It exam-
ines the efforts that a number of states have made to restrict nonresident 
campaign contributions and how these efforts have fared in the courts.29  It 
also provides statistics about how two distinct constituencies—voters and 
donors—have arisen in American politics, and it demonstrates the increasing 
extent to which American politicians have become beholden to nonresident 
donors.30  Finally, Part V explores how our campaign finance nationalism 
can be exploited by foreigners.31  If the Russian government’s aggressive at-
tempts to influence the 2016 presidential election taught us anything, it is 
that our campaign finance system remains exceedingly vulnerable to foreign 
influence.  Part V ends by examining the efforts now being advanced to pro-
 
the American people’s right to self-determination).  
 21.  See ELIZABETH BODINE-BARON ET AL., COUNTERING RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCE 2 
(2018) (explaining that Russian social media disinformation campaigns “present a significant chal-
lenge to policymakers” and arguing that Russian information interference in American elections 
“poses an immediate and real threat to U.S. democracy”). 
 22.  See id. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25.  See infra Section III.A. 
 26.  800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
 27.  See infra Section III.B. 
 28.  See infra Part IV. 
 29.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 30.  See infra Section IV.B.  
 31.  See infra Section V.A. 
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tect our country’s campaign finance nationalism.32 
II. ELECTION LAW FEDERALISM 
A. Voting, Redistricting, and Election Administration 
With few exceptions, the American electoral system is defined by its 
federalism.33  Federalism serves as the defining feature of three major areas 
of election law—voting rights, redistricting, and election administration.  
State law, whether constitutional or statutory, dictates how one qualifies to 
run for state or federal office.34  State law also dictates how citizens elect 
their state and federal officials.  State law determines how citizens qualify to 
vote, how qualified citizens register to vote, and how registered citizens cast 
their ballots in order to make their votes count.35  When it comes to electing 
the federal officials who represent the states in the U.S. Senate, the U.S. 
House of Representatives, and the Electoral College, the federal Constitution 
allocates the right to choose the members of these bodies to the states.36  The 
states, subject to some limitations, by and large oversee their own elections 
as they wish to choose their state and federal representatives.37 
Not only is voting almost entirely regulated by the states, but the act of 
voting itself is largely viewed as a states’ rights issue.38  The Constitution 
provides the federal government with relatively few abilities to regulate vot-
ing.39  The Constitution grants Congress the power to “make or alter” laws 
 
 32.  See infra Section V.B. 
 33.  See Muller, supra note 7, at 1251; see also Richard Hasen, What to Expect When You’re 
Electing: Federal Courts and the Political Thicket in 2012, 59 FED. LAW. 34, 35 (2012) (describing 
the U.S. election system as “hyperfederalized”). 
 34. See Who Can Become a Candidate for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/who-can-become-a-
candidate-for-state-legislator.aspx. 
 35.  See Hasen, supra note 33 (noting that state governments make “decisions about ballot ma-
chinery, voter registration rules, and other technical minutiae”). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
 37.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations . . . .”). 
 38.  See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (stating that voting is a states’ rights issue 
and highlighting how “[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors 
for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide elec-
tion as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college”). 
 39.  See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752 (2016) 
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concerning the “Times, Places, and Manner” of federal elections.40  It also 
sets the qualifications that candidates must have to run for President, Vice 
President, the Senate, and the House41—and the states lack the power to add 
additional qualifications to these requirements.42  In addition, Congress has 
the power to enforce certain constitutional provisions related to voting, and 
it has used its enforcement power to pass federal statutes that provide some 
uniformity for the federal elections that take place across the country.43  Be-
yond these provisions, however, the states have largely pushed back on any 
kind of federal intrusions on voting.44  As a result, the states regulate state 
and local elections in vastly different ways from one another.45 
There is a complex interplay at work between the federal government 
and the states when it comes to regulating elections.46  There is an equally 
complex relationship present between the states and their local govern-
ments.47  In practice, the states delegate much of the power to implement key 
voting-related decisions to their local governments.48  The states vest con-
 
(stating that the Constitution places “the primary responsibility for holding elections with states”); 
see also Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 88, 95 
(2014) (explaining how the federal U.S. Constitution “does not provide an explicit individual right to 
vote”). 
 40.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 
(2013). 
 41.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (presidential qualifications); U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (qual-
ifications for the Senate); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for the House). 
 42.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (“Allowing individual States 
to adopt their own qualification for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers’ 
vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States.”). 
 43.  There are four important federal statutes that govern voting across the states.  The most im-
portant of these is the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10702 (2018).  The 
others are the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (2018); 
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311 
(2018); and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (2018). 
 44.  See Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System? Uncooperative Federal-
ism in State and Local Elections, 111 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 103, 113–18 (2017) (arguing that the 
willingness of states to maintain unitary standards for elections as preferred by Congress is disinte-
grating); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1258–59 (2009) (coining the term “uncooperative federalism” and describing how states use 
their position within the system of American federalism to challenge the federal government’s au-
thority). 
 45.  See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 39, at 754 (explaining how a “great variety exists in how 
elections are administered” across the nation, not only among states “but also within states”). 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See id. 
 48.  See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 841 (2017) 
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siderable authority in county and local governments to carry out basic tasks 
like registering voters and counting ballots.49  Scholars of election law feder-
alism study and debate the nature of the complex relationships between the 
federal government and the states and between the states and their local gov-
ernments.50  They also study the power struggles that ensue between these 
various levels of government.51  A significant literature addresses the myriad 
issues implicated by these interweaving relationships.52 
Voting is not the only election-related issue controlled by the states.  
When it comes to redistricting, the states also have almost free reign to pro-
ceed as they wish.53  In drawing both their congressional and state electoral 
districts, the states function relatively independently from outside interfer-
ence.54  There are only a few federal constitutional requirements to which the 
states must adhere in redistricting.55  One is the principle of “one person, one 
vote,” which necessitates that a state’s congressional districts as well as its 
state legislative districts must be of equal population when drawn.56  These 
electoral districts also cannot be racially gerrymandered, and they must 
comply with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.57 
 
(explaining how states delegate many of their responsibilities to local governments). 
 49.  See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS 
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 20–25 (2009). 
 50.  See, e.g., Weinstein-Tull, supra note 39, at 764–75. 
 51.  See id. at 775–80 (“[E]lection law federalism is defined by two distinct features—expansive 
federal power to regulate and widespread state prerogative to delegate.”). 
 52.  See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty? Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting 
Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2012) (noting that there has been “debate over how feder-
alism affects election law”).  
 53.  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 
771–72 (2013) (describing the few limitations that states have when drawing district lines). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  According to Justin Levitt and Michael McDonald, there was originally no requirement that 
electoral districts be drawn at all, and indeed, states could at one time elect their congressional dele-
gations from at-large districts.  See Justin Levitt and Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” out of 
Redistricting: State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1251 
(2017).  In 1842, Congress began to require that each member of the House of Representatives be 
elected from a single-member district, though this requirement was removed in 1850.  It was then 
reinstated in 1862, removed again in 1929, and reinstated for good in 1967.  Id. at 1251 nn.18–19. 
 56.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
 57.  Or at least with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act that are still in force. See Shelby 
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (striking down the coverage formula of Section 4(b) of 
the Voting Rights Act, and thus leaving Section 5 of the VRA inoperable); see also Stephanopoulos, 
supra note 53, at 772 (stating that “the only universal requirements for redistricting are equal popula-
tion, the ban on racial gerrymandering, and compliance with the VRA”). 
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All other decisions concerning redistricting, however, are left to the 
states.  State constitutions often govern redistricting and dictate when it must 
happen.58  For example, the timing of redistricting following a census varies 
greatly from state to state.59  Some states draw their new district lines imme-
diately after new census numbers are released, while other states wait a year 
or even two.60  Furthermore, some states allow only one round of redistrict-
ing to occur per decade, whereas other states, controversially, draw and re-
draw their district lines mid-census, according to the wishes of their legisla-
tures.61  The method of redistricting also varies greatly from state or state.  In 
many states, ordinary legislatures carry out redistricting.62  In other states, 
nonpartisan bodies or commissions are charged with this work.63  The point 
is that redistricting is entirely a state-centered and state-run process, one that 
is emblematic of America’s election law federalism. 
Election administration is a state-run process as well.  The states act as 
the final decision-makers on their voting machines, voter ID laws, provi-
sional and absentee ballots, and voter registration requirements.64  Decisions 
about these aspects of administering elections are heavily regulated by state 
law.  To be sure, recently both Congress and the federal courts have begun 
to play a greater role in election administration.65  With the passage of the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NRVA),66 and, in the aftermath of 
Bush v. Gore,67 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),68 Congress 
has imposed new requirements on the states concerning their voting technol-
ogy, voter identification provisions, provisional voting requirements, and 
 
 58.  See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art II, § 2 (outlining New Jersey’s redistricting requirements). 
 59.  See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 55, at 1257–58. 
 60.  Id. at 1257. 
 61.  Id. at 1258. 
 62.  See JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20–26 (2010). 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See Michael M. Uhlmann, Federalism and Election Reform, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 491, 502 
(2002) (noting how “[t]he dominant feature of election administration in the United States is its re-
markable, even radical decentralization”). 
 65. See Daniel Tokaji & Owen Wolfe, Baker, Bush, and Ballot Boards: The Federalization of 
Election Administration, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969, 979 (2012).  
 66. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (2012 & Supp. 2015)).   
 67.  531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 68.  Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended 
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (2012 & Supp. 2015)). 
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voter registration systems.69  These federal statutes constitute the most ex-
pansive federal intervention into the states’ administration of their elections 
in U.S. history.70  Still, it is state law that makes these new requirements 
come to fruition.71  State law also often does the opposite, imposing re-
strictions on voter registration and early voting, and establishing voter ID 
requirements and other restrictions that impact a voter’s experience at the 
polls before Election Day arrives and a citizen’s vote is even cast.72 
The states are also the dominant regulators of our political parties.73  
State law dictates the requirements that a party must meet to register with the 
state.74  State law regulates how parties must go about conducting their pri-
mary elections and the ballot access requirements that political parties must 
guarantee to voters—including whether state primaries will be open, closed, 
semi-closed, blanket, or top-two in nature.75  In general, once political par-
ties are established, the states may not regulate their internal structure, gov-
ernance, or policymaking.76  But only the state can determine whether a new 
party will be recognized in the first place.  Some scholars argue that parties 
must be allowed to have the First Amendment right to associate with which-
ever voters they wish, but the states, which pay the bill for party primary 
elections, have not always allowed this to be the case in practice.77 
 
 69.  Tokaji & Wolfe, supra note 65, at 984. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 
ELECTION L.J. 97, 98 (2012) (chronicling these efforts by states, and their effects, in 2011). 
 73.  See State Regulations that Affect Political Parties, ELECTION L. ISSUES 3-1, 
http://www.electionlawissues.org/Resources/~/media/Microsites/Files/election/Chapter%20Three%2
0-%20Proofed2.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2019). 
 74.  See, e.g., Political Party Qualification, CAL. SECRETARY OF ST., 
https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/political-parties/political-party-qualification/ (last visited Mar. 16, 
2019) (explaining California’s requirements for qualifying as a political party).  
 75.  See State Regulations that Affect Political Parties, supra note 73. 
 76. All voters are eligible to vote in open primaries, regardless of party affiliation. In closed pri-
maries, only members of the party are allowed to vote. In semi-closed primaries, party members and 
independent voters who are not affiliated with another party are allowed to vote. In blanket prima-
ries, voters choose one candidate per office, regardless of the candidate’s party affiliation, and the 
top vote getters from each party then advance to the general election. See Timmons v. Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997).  Finally, in a top-two primary, all candidates are listed 
on the same primary ballot, and the top-two voter getters, regardless of their partisan affiliation, ad-
vance to the general election. For example, California uses a top-two primary system today.  
 77.  See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, It’s My Party and I’ll Do What Want To: Political Parties, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of Association, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 65, 66, 80–
81 (2013) (arguing that political parties, though governed by state law, are also expressive associa-
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There are important debates in the scholarly community about election 
law federalism, what constitutes it, and what role the federal government 
(and the federal courts) should play in overseeing election-related reforms in 
the states.78  The literature on election law federalism celebrates the demo-
cratic laboratories that emerge when the states advance and defend their 
unique republican forms of government.79  The distinctions in how individu-
al states articulate their government aspirations are important.80  The varia-
tions in state law play a role not only in safeguarding each state’s democratic 
identity, but also in safeguarding our federal system.81  Much of the election 
law literature makes this point in various different ways.  To scholars of all 
stripes, election law federalism is invoked as an important safeguard that 
preserves the integrity of the American electoral system as a whole.82 
Even our presidential elections, which are national in scope (and certain-
ly so in their consequences), are driven by the dynamics of federalism.83  
The selection of presidential electors occurs on a state-by-state basis.84  The 
electors cast their presidential ballots in their respective states.85  State law 
dictates how each state will allocate its electors to the Electoral College, just 
 
tions that, under some circumstances, should be able to free themselves from state regulation). 
 78.  See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, Neoliberal Political Law, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 218 
(“The Court’s election-law federalism jurisprudence suggests that it perceives the federalism princi-
ple as more about limiting federal power than granting power to the states.”). 
 79.  Anthony Johnstone, The Federalist Safeguards of Politics, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 
419 (2016).  
 80.  Id. at 420. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 
UTAH L. REV. 859, 860 (2010) (arguing that that partisan gerrymandering, though sometimes antag-
onistic to democratic ideals, can potentially be democracy-enhancing and federalism-reinforcing and 
often acts as a structural safeguard of federalism).  But see David Schleicher, Federalism and State 
Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 768 (2017) (arguing that federalism doctrine, policy, and theory 
does not take the “second order” problem of state elections seriously, in that state elections are still 
often influenced by national considerations).  Schleicher uses the term “second-order elections” to 
refer to “elections at one level of government that reflect voter preferences developed in relation to 
another level of government.”  Id. at 772.  Most voters “use their national-level preferences in state 
legislative elections and pay little attention to what state legislators . . . actually think or how they 
voted.”  Id. at 774–75.  The result is that voters in a federal system know little about state govern-
ment.  Id. 
 83.  See Muller, supra note 7, at 1251. 
 84.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §1, cl. 2; id. amend XII.  
 85.  U.S. CONST. amend XII; see also U.S. Electoral College: About the Electors, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES AND RECS. ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-
college/electors.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2019). 
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as it dictates how the selection of presidential electors will be administered.86  
While some states apportion electors state-wide on a winner-take-all basis, 
other states apportion them by congressional district or proportionally.87  
The Framers purposefully designed the Electoral College to be elected on a 
state-by-state basis to guard against the “heat and ferments” that could sway 
electors’ deliberations if they convened in one place and at one time.88  Since 
the nation’s founding, individual states have elected presidential electors 
without regard to the selection method used by other states.89  Calls to abol-
ish the Electoral College and have the President be elected by popular vote, 
which surface now and again, would have to find a way to contend with the 
many aspects of federalism that permeate our electoral system.90 
B. Campaign Finance  
Campaign finance presents a complicated wrinkle for election law fed-
eralism.91  Unlike the other areas of election law, campaign finance does not 
respect state or local boundaries.  Instead, our campaign finance system is 
almost entirely national in scope.92  For instance, while state law imposes 
unique contribution limits and disclosure rules for the election of state and 
local officials (see the Appendix),93 the states are not able to prevent outsid-
 
 86.  See Summary: State Laws Regarding Presidential Electors, NAT’L ASS’N OF SECRETARIES 
OF ST. (Nov. 2016), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/2017-08/research-state-laws-
pres-electors-nov16.pdf (summarizing the laws in all fifty states which govern the electoral process). 
 87.  See U.S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECS. 
ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2019) (explaining how “[t]he District of Columbia and 48 states have a winner-takes-all rule for the 
Electoral College.  In these States, whichever candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, or a 
plurality of the popular vote . . . takes all of the state’s Electoral votes.  Only two states, Nebraska 
and Maine, do not follow the winner-takes-all rule.  In those states, there could be a split of Electoral 
votes among candidates through the state’s system for proportional allocation of votes.”). 
 88.  Muller, supra note 7, at 1243 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 457–58 (Alexander Ham-
ilton)). 
 89.  Id. at 1239. 
 90.  Id. at 1292. 
 91.  See Garrick Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. 781, 
786 (2014) (positing how, in the scholarly literature, “[u]nexamined so far . . . are the effects . . . of 
modern campaign finance law . . . on federalism”).  
 92.  See Fontana, supra note 3, at 1266 (“Campaign finance law does not include any meaningful 
geographical limitations.”); R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41542, THE STATE OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2018). 
 93.  See State Limits on Contributions to Candidates: 2017–2018 Election Cycle, NAT’L CONF. 
OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jun. 27, 2017), 
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ers from contributing to the campaigns of these officials.94  The only bound-
aries that campaign finance law adheres to are based on national citizen-
ship.95  In our political system, all U.S. citizens (and lawful permanent resi-
dents) may freely spend money to influence elections, either in their home 
jurisdictions or in other jurisdictions, including those where they do not re-
side.  But that is not the case concerning citizens of other countries. Under 
the law, “foreign nationals” are precluded from making contributions or ex-
penditures to influence any federal, state, or local election.96 
Campaign finance differs in this way because it is governed by an en-
tirely different body of law.  The complicated interplay between state stat-
utes and state constitutional provisions that characterizes most of the law of 
voting does not apply to two major areas of campaign finance that are entire-
ly national in scope and spill across state lines: contributions and expendi-
tures.97  Then again, these two areas of campaign finance are not internation-
al in scope and do not extend across international borders to foreign citizens. 
How this situation came to be deserves some explanation. 
Congress attempted to regulate campaign finance piecemeal through 
various federal statutes adopted during the first half of the twentieth centu-
ry.98  But our modern campaign finance system traces its true origins to the 
early 1970s, when Congress adopted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (FECA),99 a federal statute that was then amended in 1974 in the wake 
of the Watergate scandal.100  These 1974 amendments sought to regulate var-
ious aspects of money in politics wholesale.  Congress sought to regulate 
 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Contribution_Limits_to_Candidates_2017-
2018_16465.pdf (listing limits on campaign contributions by state). 
 94.  See Mazo, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 95.  See Who Can and Can’t Contribute, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cant-contribute/ (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2019). 
 96. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2002). 
 97.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The Distinction Between Contribution Limits and Ex-
penditure Limits, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-
the-distinction-between-contribution-limits-and-expenditure-limits/. 
 98.  The Tillman Act of 1907 barred corporations from making contributions to federal candi-
dates, a ban that remains in effect today.  In 1943, Congress barred unions from doing the same 
when it passed the Smith Connally Act, although this law was repealed in 1946.  In 1947, Congress 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which banned both corporations and unions from making expenditures 
relating to any federal primary or general election.  See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, 
AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 152–57 (1988).  
 99. Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (February 7, 1972) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.). 
 100.  See MUTCH, supra note 98, at 48–50. 
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contributions, or the amount that a person could give to a candidate or cam-
paign; to regulate expenditures, or the amount that a candidate or campaign 
could spend on its own (or that a person not affiliated with a campaign could 
spend independently); to mandate disclosure, which referred to the require-
ment that campaigns, committees, and donors must publicly report their con-
tributions and expenditures; and to provide for a system of public financing, 
which refers to funding that a federal candidate could seek from the gov-
ernment.101  In addition, FECA’s 1974 amendments created a new govern-
ment agency, the Federal Election Commission, to oversee, administer, and 
enforce the new campaign finance scheme created by Congress.102 
In 1976, the constitutionality of FECA’s 1974 amendments was chal-
lenged in Buckley v. Valeo,103 which became the seminal case of American 
campaign finance law.104  In Buckley, the Supreme Court scrutinized FECA 
through the prism of the First Amendment.105  The Court allowed the gov-
ernment to place restrictions on campaign contributions to federal candi-
dates, but it recognized only one justification for doing so: “the prevention 
of corruption or the appearance of corruption.”106  At the same time, the 
Court mandated that independent expenditures receive different treatment.  
It reasoned that independent expenditures made “relative to a clearly identi-
fied candidate” constituted core political speech and were entitled to greater 
constitutional protection than contributions.107  The Court held that re-
 
 101.  See Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner, Democracy by the Wealthy: Campaign Finance 
Reform as the Issue of Our Time, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
IN AMERICA 9 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K Kuhner eds., 2018).  
 102. Id. 
 103.  424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 104.  See L. PAIGE  WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30669, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: BUCKLEY V. VALEO AND ITS SUPREME COURT PROGENY 45 n.320 
(2008); see also Mazo & Kuhner, supra note 101, at 9 (noting how Buckley “still stands as the semi-
nal case of American campaign finance law”). 
 105.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (“The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in 
an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”). 
 106.  Id. at 25.  While the Court in Buckley identified the prevention of corruption or its appear-
ance as a sufficient government interest to justify restrictions on contributions to candidates, the 
Court did not precisely define what “corruption” meant.  In justifying the government’s ability to 
limit campaign contributions, the Court did explain that, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are 
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
system of representative democracy is undermined,” and it did go on to state how “[o]f almost equal 
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corrup-
tion stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
individual financial contributions.”  Id. at 26–27. 
 107.  Id. at 39–45. 
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strictions on independent expenditures should be subject to the “exacting 
scrutiny.”108  In practice, this meant the government would not be able to 
place any meaningful limits on such expenditures. 
The Court likewise held that limits on a candidate’s own expenditures, 
or the use of his personal funds, could not be restricted, since “[t]he candi-
date, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage 
in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate 
his own election.”109  And it rejected equality as a rationale for regulation.  
“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment,” the Court said.110 In an effort to avoid problems of 
overbreadth and vagueness under the First Amendment, the Court limited 
the reach of FECA’s regulatory regime to “express advocacy.”111  This was 
the term of art used to refer to speech that directly names a candidate for of-
fice and specifically calls for his or her election or defeat,112 such as by say-
ing “Vote for Bernie” or “Defeat Hillary.”  However, Buckley held that “is-
sue advocacy”—or speech aimed at educating the public on issues of general 
concern that did not directly call for the election or defeat of a particular po-
litical candidate—did not fall within FECA’s regulatory scheme.113   
By the 1990s, corporate and union spending on sham issue ads began.114  
These were advertisements paid for by corporations and unions that were 
meant to influence what voters thought of a particular candidate, but that, 
because they omitted words such as “vote for” or “vote against,” escaped 
regulation.115  In passing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA),116 Congress closed several loopholes in federal campaign finance 
law, including the problem of sham issue ads.  Congress addressed the prob-
 
 108.  Id. at 44–45. 
 109.  Id. at 52. 
 110.  Id. at 48–49.  See also Richard L. Hasen. The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in ELECTION 
LAW STORIES 305 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016) (calling the above line “one 
of the most famous (some would say notorious) sentences in Buckley”). 
 111.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
 112.  Id. at 43; see also Hasen, supra note 17, at 588–89.  
 113.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–46; see also Hasen, supra note 17, at 588–89. 
 114.  Hasen, supra note 17, at 589.  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (March 27, 
2002).  BCRA amended FECA, which appears at 52 U.S.C. §30101 et seq.  BCRA is also commonly 
known as the “McCain-Feingold Law.”  See GARRETT, supra note 92, at 4 n.12. 
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lem of sham issue ads by inventing a new term of art, the “electioneering 
communication.”117  This was as a broadcast, cable, or satellite communica-
tion that reached 50,000 people, featured a candidate seeking federal office, 
and aired 30 days before a primary election or 60 days before a general elec-
tion.118  BCRA prohibited corporations and unions from paying for such 
communications with their general treasury funds, a prohibition that the 
Court upheld in McConnell v. FEC in 2003.119  That paved the way for Citi-
zens United,120 in which the Court overruled earlier precedent,121 before 
holding, 5–4, that BCRA’s prohibition on corporate electioneering commu-
nications violated the First Amendment.122  In effect, Citizens United recog-
nized that corporations had First Amendment rights, too.123  The case be-
came, in Professor Michael Kang’s words, “a clear turning point not just for 
campaign finance law but for all regulation of the relationship between cam-
paign money and the political process.”124 
The immediate consequence of Citizens United was that federal and 
state laws prohibiting corporate speech—at least in the form of corporate 
and union spending on elections—became unconstitutional.125  But it was the 
reasoning Citizens United employed that concerns us.  The Court labeled the 
government’s restrictions on corporate expenditures a form of discrimination 
relative to the First Amendment rights of ordinary citizens.126  It should not 
matter that the party wishing to make these independent expenditures was a 
 
 117.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (previously codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)). 
 118.  52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A). 
 119. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 120.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 121. Id. at 365 (overruling  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
 122.  Id. at 319, 372.  
 123.  Id. at 365 (holding that “the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of 
the speaker’s corporate identity” because “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the 
political speech of non-profit or for-profit corporations”). 
 124.  Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).  Citizens 
United also changed the structure of politics in ways that have serious implications for federalism, 
leading many scholars to criticize the decision in that regard, too.  See, e.g., Pursley, supra note 91, 
at 820 (arguing that Citizens United and subsequent campaign decisions have “erode[d] the relation-
ship between federal candidates and their geographic constituencies”); Franita Tolson, The Federal-
ism Implications of Campaign Finance Regulation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 247, 251 (2016) (ex-
plaining how “the Court’s approach in its recent cases—let everyone in, let everyone spend—stands 
in tension with the truly pluralistic and inclusive systems that states are seeking to implement.”).  
 125.  Id. (explaining how as a result of Citizens United “meaningful checks on the influence of 
money must come, if they come at all, from somewhere other than campaign finance law”). 
 126.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349; Kang, supra note 124, at 12–13. 
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corporation, the Court held, since “the First Amendment generally prohibits 
the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”127  This 
reasoning unsettled campaign finance law and soon fostered a new kind of 
spending in American elections.128  How far the mandate not to discriminate 
against “the speaker’s identity” should extend, however, was a question that 
the Court’s majority left explicitly unanswered.129 After all, if corporations 
had free speech rights, did that mean that foreigners had them too?  
III. THE BIRTH OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE NATIONALISM 
A. The Prohibition of Foreigners 
Foreign influence on American elections has long been worrisome.  
From the very beginning, America’s Framers demonstrated concern about 
the possible corrupting effects that foreign powers could have on the young 
republic.130  “During and after the Revolutionary War,” Zephyr Teachout 
explains in her book on the history of corruption, “the new Americans were 
driven by a fear of being corrupted by foreign powers, and a related fear of 
adopting the Old World’s corrupt habits.”131  At various times in American 
history, Congress tried to ban foreigners from influencing the nation’s poli-
tics.  Often these efforts followed a scandal in which one political party re-
vealed the corrupting influence of foreigners on American policy.132  In 
 
 127.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350. 
 128.  See id. at 395 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court today rejects a century of history when it 
treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty  
. . . .”).  The ban on corporate participation in American elections had a long history, as Justice Ste-
vens pointed out in his powerful dissent in Citizens United.  Id.  The ban on corporate participation 
in campaign finance went back to the Tillman Act of 1907 and the Taft Hartley Act of 1947.  See 
ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 7–8 (2014).  
 129.  See  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (“We need not reach the question whether the Govern-
ment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our 
Nation’s political process.”).  
 130.  See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 353 (2009) 
(explaining how, at the Constitutional Convention, the Framers were “concerned that the small size 
of the young country (compared to the great European powers) would open it up to foreign corrup-
tion”).  
 131.  ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX 
TO CITIZENS UNITED 18 (2014). 
 132.  See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at 90 (1969) (explaining how, in 1789, the Federal-
ists and Republicans had accused each other of being corrupted by foreign influence). 
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1798, for instance, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, a series of 
four laws that restricted the activities of foreign residents in the United 
States by limiting their freedoms of speech and of the press.133 
By the 1930s, Congress was again concerned by the growing foreign in-
fluence over U.S. policymaking.  In response, it enacted the Foreign Agent 
Registration Act of 1938 (FARA),134 a federal statute that imposed a re-
quirement for the “agents” of “foreign principals” to register with the federal 
government.135  Despite these registration requirements, there was no formal 
statutory prohibition to prevent foreigners from making direct contributions 
to American political campaigns.136  Rather, the significant prohibitions of 
contributions were aimed at corporations and unions at the time.  Since 
1907, the Tillman Act had prohibited corporations from making contribu-
tions to influence federal elections.137  Later, in 1947, Congress passed the 
Taft-Hartley Act, which “banned any corporate or union contributions or ex-
penditures relating to any federal primary . . . or general election.”138 
In the 1960s, calls for more regulation of foreign activity in the United 
States came again, this time after it was revealed that foreign interests had 
been contributing funds to U.S. federal election campaigns in the hopes of 
gaining sympathy in Washington.139  Sugar manufacturers from the Philip-
pines, seeking to influence legislation concerning sugar import quotas, were 
the major sources of these contributions.140  The chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, opened 
 
 133.  See Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing Foreign Influence 
in U.S. Elections after Citizens United v. FEC, 44 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 951, 963 (2011) (discussing 
the Alien and Sedition Acts).  The Alien and Sedition Acts were four separate laws.  Id. at 965 n.78.  
The Naturalization Act “extended the residency requirement for aliens to become citizens to fourteen 
years.”  Id. at 965.  The Alien Friends Act made any alien thought to be a danger to the safety of the 
United States eligible for deportation.  The Alien Enemies Act allowed aliens whose home countries 
were at war with the United States to be deported.  Finally, the Sedition Act “made it a crime to pub-
lish ‘false, scandalous and malicious’ writings against the [U.S.] government.”  Id. 
 134.  Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 611–621 (2006)). 
 135.  22 U.S.C. § 612 (2006) (discussing who needs to be registered as a foreign principal). 
 136.  Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence 
over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1989).  
 137.  See Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864 (Jan. 26, 1907).  
 138.  See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (later codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–166 (2006)); see also Vega, supra note 133, at 969, 969 n.111. 
 139.  Vega, supra note 133, at 970–71. 
 140.  Id. at 971 n.121. 
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hearings on this issue.141  These hearings revealed how various foreign inter-
ests, through their Washington lawyers and lobbyists, had been channeling 
campaign funds to sympathetic legislators seeking re-election.142  Although it 
was not illegal for lawyers and lobbyists to make campaign contributions on be-
half of foreign principals,143 the Fulbright hearings brought to light how for-
eigners were influencing the nation’s policies through their agents.144 
After these hearings, Senator Fulbright put forth a bill to amend FARA 
to prohibit this kind of activity.145  This bill sought to limit foreign influence 
over American elections by prohibiting the agent of a foreign principal from 
making contributions to political candidates.146  In 1966, Congress officially 
amended FARA to make it a felony for an “agent of a foreign principal” to 
knowingly make, promise, solicit, accept, or receive any contribution from a 
foreign principal.147 The language of this prohibition did not entirely solve 
the problem, however, for the amended law failed to prevent foreign princi-
pals from contributing campaign funds directly to candidates.148  Donations 
 
 141. See  Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 827 (1963).  
 142.  Vega, supra note 133, at 993 n.259. 
 143.  Damrosch, supra note 136, at 22.  
 144.  Id. at 22 n.82.  Senator Fulbright wanted foreign governments and businesses to promote 
their interests through official diplomatic channels, but foreign entities considered it was more effec-
tive to hire U.S. lawyers and lobbyists to advance their causes.  See Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: 
The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
503, 509 (1997) (reviewing the Fulbright hearings and the impetus behind them); see also Daniel M. 
Berman & Robert A. Heineman, Lobbying by Foreign Governments on the Sugar Act Amendments 
of 1962, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 416, 419 (1963) (explaining the incentives of foreign actors). 
 145.  Damrosch, supra note 133, at 23 (“As a result of the hearing, Senator Fulbright introduced a 
bill to prohibit campaign contributions for or on behalf of a foreign principal in connection with any 
election to public office.”).  Enacted in 1938, FARA was designed to stem the spread of Nazi propa-
ganda as the United States entered World War II.  See Vega, supra note 133, at 968–69 (discussing 
why Congress amended FARA during World War II).  Rather than restrict propaganda as such, 
FARA required disclosure and transparency of foreign agents in the United States.  Id.  FARA was 
also used after World War II to curb communist propaganda.  Id. at 969–70 (explaining Congress’ 
fear of promoting communist ideas).  Amendments to FARA enacted in 1942 elaborated FARA’s 
purpose to “protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States 
by requiring public disclosure . . . [of] activities for or on behalf of foreign governments . . . .”  See 
Jahad Atieh, Foreign Agents: Updating FARA to Protect American Democracy, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
1051, 1057 (2010).  In 1942, jurisdiction over enforcing the provisions of FARA was passed to the 
Department of Justice, in the hopes that the statute would be enforced more robustly.  Id. (explaining 
why FARA was amended).  However, the Department of Justice largely failed to enforce FARA, and 
the public outcry over this failure led to the Fulbright hearings.  Id. at 1057–58. 
 146.  Damrosch, supra note 136, at 22–23 (explaining the purpose of Senator Fulbright’s bill). 
 147.  Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-486, § 8, 80 Stat. 248–49 (1966). 
 148.  Atieh, supra note 145, at 1058–59 (indicating why the amended law failed). 
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were not considered illegal under the new prohibition unless they were dis-
tributed through an agent,149 and in 1972, President Richard Nixon exploited 
this loophole by accepting large foreign contributions for his presidential 
campaign.  During the Watergate hearings, Congress discovered that Nixon 
took in over $10 million in overseas donations.150 These contributions came 
directly from foreigners, rather than from their U.S.-based agents.151  Until 
the Federal Election Campaign Act’s disclosure regime came into effect in 
April 1972, there were no disclosure requirements for pre-nomination presi-
dential candidates, which explains how Nixon was able to accept these for-
eign contributions without ever having to report them.152 
When Nixon’s reliance on foreign money came to light in the aftermath 
of Watergate, Congress began to consider ways to amend the prohibition on 
foreign contributions.153  In 1974, when the revisions to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act were being debated, Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas offered 
an amendment aimed at preventing foreign nationals from influencing U.S. 
elections.154  Bentsen did not think that foreigners had any business in Amer-
ican political campaigns.  “They cannot vote in our elections so why should 
we allow them to finance our elections?” Bentsen asked.155  “Their loyalties 
lie elsewhere; they lie with their own countries and their own govern-
ments.”156  Bentsen proposed a solution that came to be known as the 
“Bentsen Amendment.”157  His purpose in offering it was to “ban the contri-
butions of foreign nationals to campaign funds in American political cam-
 
 149.  See Jeffrey K. Powell, Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions From Foreign Sources: 
Questioning Their Justification in a Global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
957, 960–61 (1996); Daniel Scott Savrin, Curtailing Foreign Financial Participation in Domestic 
Elections: A Proposal to Reform the Federal Election Campaign Act, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 783, 791 
(1988).  
 150.  See Vega, supra note 133, at 971–72 (citing the figure of $10 million in foreign donations to 
Nixon’s campaign). 
 151.  Id.  
 152.  See FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF 
RICHARD NIXON 108–09 (1994). 
 153.  Powell, supra note 149, at 961; see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, How Much is an Ambassa-
dorship? And the Tale of How Watergate Led to a Strong Corrupt Foreign Practices Act and a Weak 
Federal Election Campaign Act, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 71, 80–85 (2012) (discussing the Watergate 
scandal and how this loophole allowed for corrupt campaign practices). 
 154.  120 CONG. REC. 8783 (Mar. 28, 1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).  
 155.  Id.; see also Vega, supra note 133, at 973 (quoting the same language). 
 156.  120 CONG. REC. 8783 (Mar. 28, 1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).  
 157.  Powell, supra note 149, at 961; Vega, supra note 133, at 972. 
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paigns.”158  The privilege to contribute to campaigns, Bentsen argued, should 
“be limited to U.S. citizens and to those who have indicated their intention to 
live here, are here legally, and are permanent residents.”159 
The Bentsen Amendment added a provision to FECA’s 1974 amend-
ments160—the same ones that would be challenged in Buckley v. Valeo161—
which sought to close one of the major loopholes in FARA.162  It struck the 
words “an agent of a foreign principal” from FARA and inserted the words 
“a foreign national” in their place.163  The Bentsen Amendment then went on 
to explain that “a foreign national” was being used in the same way as “for-
eign principal” was previously defined in FARA, except that the new term 
did not include any citizen of the United States or any individual who is law-
fully admitted for permanent residence in the United States.164  Importantly, 
FARA’s previous use of the term “foreign principal” had applied not only to 
individuals, but to other foreign actors as well.165  A “foreign principal” in-
cluded a corporation “organized under the laws of or having its principal 
place of business in a foreign country.”166  It also included foreign govern-
ments and foreign political parties,167 as well as, of course, non-citizens who 
did not have permanent residence in the United States.168   
In 1976, Congress granted the FEC jurisdiction to implement and en-
force the Bentsen Amendment.169  Eventually, the Bentsen Amendment was 
 
 158.  120 CONG. REC. 8782 (Mar. 28, 1974). 
 159.  Id. at 8784; see also Savrin, supra note 149, at 793 n.40 (quoting the same language); Vega, 
supra note 133, at 973 n.133 (quoting similar language).  
 160.  Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974). 
 161.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 162. 120 CONG. REC. 8783 (Mar. 28, 1974). 
 163.  120 CONG. REC. 8786 (Mar. 28, 1974).  
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (2006). 
 166.  22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3).  As commentators have pointed out, however, the statute created a 
loophole that allows foreign corporations to make contributions through their U.S. subsidiaries.  See 
Powell, supra note 149, at 964.  The FEC has issued several advisory opinions that have interpreted 
Section 441e to allow domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations to make contributions to candi-
dates.  As Powell explains, “[d]espite the fact that the domestic subsidiary may be foreign controlled 
or even wholly-owned by its foreign parent, the statute did not define it as a foreign national if it was 
chartered in the United States and had its principal place of business in the United States.”  Id.  
 167.  22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(1). 
 168.  2 U.S.C. § 441e(b)(2) (1994).   
 169.  See Vega, supra note 133, at 973; see also Powell, supra note 149, at 958 n.5. 
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codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e.170  Subsection (a) of the statute read as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for a foreign national directly or through any 
other person to make any contribution of money or other thing of 
value, or to promise expressly or impliedly to make any such con-
tribution, in connection with an election to any political office or in 
connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to 
select candidates for any political office; or for any person to solicit, 
accept, or receive any such contribution from a foreign national.171 
When initially crafted, the law only applied to contributions. It prohibited 
foreign nationals from donating money or any other thing of value in con-
nection “with an election to any political office.”172  The law also imposed 
liability on a person who tried to “solicit, accept, or receive” a contribution 
from a foreign national.173  This was so regardless of whether the person 
“knew that the source of the donation is foreign.”174  Congress wanted to en-
sure broad liability and framed the law to extend beyond only those actors 
who were contributing foreign money.175  Importantly, Congress also made 
the provisions of Section 441e apply to contributions given to campaigns in 
all elections, including “any primary election, convention, or caucus held to 
select candidates for any political office.”176  This meant the provisions ap-
plied to federal elections as well as to state and local ones.177 
Section 441e was the beginning of America’s campaign finance nation-
alism.  For the first time, this provision explicitly made it illegal for foreign-
ers to make direct contributions to American political campaigns. Nonethe-
less, gaps in the statutory scheme remained.  The 1974 restrictions, for 
 
 170.  Pub. L. No. 93-443, §101, 80 Stat. 1267 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112(2), 90 Stat. 493 
(1976) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e (1994)).  
 171. Pub. L. 92–225, title III, §319, as added Pub. L. 94–283, title I, §112(2), May 11, 1976, 90 
Stat. 493; Pub. L. No. 96–187, title I, §105(5), Jan. 8, 1980, 93 Stat. 1354; amended Pub. L. No. 
107–155, title III, §§ 303, 317, Mar 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 96, 109 (originally codified at 2 U.S.C. § 
441e(a) (1976)). 
 172.  2 U.S.C. § 441e(a). 
 173.  § 441e(a); see also Donna M. Ballman, Political Campaign Contributions by Foreign Na-
tionals in Florida Elections, 65 FLA. B.J. 31, 32 (1991) (listing examples of what does and does not 
count as any “other thing of value”). 
 174.  See Powell, supra note 149, at 963 (explaining that Congress did not intend one’s lack of 
knowledge of the donation’s source to act as a shield against liability). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  2 U.S.C. § 441e(a). 
 177.  Id.  
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example, did not eliminate the possibility that foreign citizens might still in-
fluence American elections by making contributions to political parties, 
which could then give the money to the candidates.  In this way, foreigners 
could impact American elections through what came to be known as the 
“soft money loophole,” without the need to contribute directly to candidates 
themselves.  In 1996, attempts by foreigners to influence that year’s presi-
dential election led to a public outcry, and eventually to an investigation by 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.178  The Committee found 
that foreigners had exploited the soft money loophole and bought access to 
American public officials by making contributions to political parties.179  
The Committee also discovered efforts made by Chinese officials to influ-
ence U.S. policy through the indirect financing of campaigns.180 
In response to this controversy, when Congress passed the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act in 2002 (BCRA),181 it amended Section 441e to ex-
pand the scope of election-related activities that would be banned for foreign 
nationals.  Subsection (a) of Section 441e soon read as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for— 
(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make 
A contribution of donation of money or other thing of value, or to 
make an express or limited promise to make a contribution or dona-
tion, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election; 
A contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; 
An expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an 
electioneering communication . . . ; or 
(2) A person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation 
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a for-
 
 178.  See  Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) 
(noting how “[a]ctivities by foreign citizens in the 1996 election cycle sparked public controversy 
and an extensive investigation by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs”).  
 179.  Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 105-167, at 781–2010, 4619–5925 (1998).  
 180.  S. Rep. No. 105-167, at 2501–12; see also Vega, supra note 133, at 974.  
 181.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §303, 116 Stat. 81, 96.  
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eign national.182 
This new language differed from the old in important ways.  First, the 
statute now mentioned that it would be unlawful for a foreign national to 
contribute money or other thing of value not just in connection with “an 
election to any political office” (as the old language held), but specifically 
“in connection with a Federal, State, or local election.”  This ensured that the 
ban on foreign nationals would be enforced nationally at all levels of the 
American political system.  Second, the new language made it clear that 
contributions “to a committee of a political party” would be banned, too, 
thus closing the soft money loophole.  Finally, the statute was updated to in-
clude a ban on expenditures.  Foreign nationals were now not only prohibit-
ed from making contributions, but also, in light of BCRA’s new regulatory 
scheme, from making “[a]n expenditure, independent expenditure, or dis-
bursement for an electioneering communication.”183  This last provision 
would eventually be challenged on First Amendment grounds. 
B. Bluman v. Federal Election Commission 
The ban preventing foreign nationals from participating in American 
elections remained unchallenged for thirty-six years.  Then Citizens United 
was decided, and that ban was brought into question.184  Citizens United was 
not a case about foreigners.  Rather, it was a case that overturned the prohi-
bition in American law that had prevented corporations from using their 
treasury funds to make independent expenditures to influence elections.185  
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy’s 5–4 majority opinion, and in particular the 
robust view of the First Amendment it espoused, made many observers 
wonder how long the ban barring foreign nationals from participating in 
campaign finance could stand. Justice Kennedy reasoned that corporations 
could not be prevented from spending their money on elections because the 
First Amendment prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the 
speaker’s identity.186  Whether that dictate applied to the speech of foreign-
ers, however, was a question the Supreme Court left deliberately unan-
 
 182. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a). 
 183.  2 U.S.C. § 441(e)(a)(1)(B).  
 184.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 185.  Id. at 365 (Kennedy, J.) (overturning prior prohibitions on American corporations’ use of 
independent expenditures to influence federal elections). 
 186.  Id. at 350. 
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swered.187  In the eyes of some commentators, the only way the Court could 
strike down a ban on speech for corporations but uphold that same ban for 
foreigners was by engaging in “doctrinal incoherence.”188 
The Court’s opportunity to demonstrate how it would handle foreign 
campaign spending after Citizens United came in Bluman v. FEC.189  In 
Bluman, the Court upheld the ban on foreign spending found in Section 
441e.190  It did so, however, without hearing oral arguments or issuing a 
written opinion.  Rather, the written opinion in Bluman was handed down by 
a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
and that decision was then simply summarily affirmed by the Supreme 
Court.191  This meant that the Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s 
result, though not necessarily with its reasoning.192 
The plaintiffs in Bluman were two foreign citizens living and working in 
the United States on temporary visas.  While in the United States, they 
hoped to spend money on election-related activities.193  Benjamin Bluman 
was a Canadian citizen who had come to the United States to attend Harvard 
Law School.194  From September 2006 to June 2009, he resided in the United 
States on a student visa.195  In November 2009, Bluman began working as an 
associate at a New York law firm, at which point he obtained a temporary 
 
 187.  Id. at 362 (“We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling inter-
est in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political pro-
cess.”). 
 188.  See Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, supra note 17, at 610 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court can only “sustain a law imposing foreign spending limits without overturning 
Citizens United . . . through doctrinal incoherence”).  Professor Hasen has offered that one way the 
Court could try to bring coherence to the doctrine is to “state that the threat from foreign spending 
influencing U.S. elections is one different in kind than that posed by domestic corporate spending, 
and that when it comes to protecting the country from foreign influence, the First Amendment must 
give way.”  Id.  However, such an argument would not be convincing, according to Professor Hasen, 
because it would not be premised on combating corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Id. 
 189.  800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
 190.  Id. at 288 (upholding the ban and explaining how “the United States has a compelling interest 
. . . in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic self-
government, and thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.”). 
 191.  See Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (summarily affirming the lower court’s decision 
without comment). 
 192.  Id. at 1104. 
 193.  Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
 194.  Id. at 285 (stating that Bluman came to the United States to attend law school); RICHARD L. 
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 18, at 16 (identifying Bluman’s law school as Harvard). 
 195.  Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285. 
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work visa.196  Bluman wanted to make contributions to three political candi-
dates: Jay Inslee, then a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives from Washington; Diane Savino, a state senator from New York; 
and Barack Obama, who was then President.197  In addition, Bluman wanted 
to spend money to print flyers supporting President Obama’s re-election, 
which he hoped to distribute in New York City’s Central Park.198 
Asenath Steiman, Bluman’s co-plaintiff, was a dual citizen of Canada 
and Israel who was also in the United States on a temporary work visa.199  
She was working as a medical resident at a hospital in New York City.200  
Steiman wanted to contribute money to Tom Coburn, a Republican U.S. 
Senator from Oklahoma; a yet-to-be-named candidate for the Republican 
nomination for President in 2012; the National Republican Senatorial Com-
mittee; and the Club for Growth, a conservative organization that advocates 
for smaller government.201  All of these activities were barred by Section 
441e, under the amendments enacted to that statue in 2002. 
The unanimous opinion for the three-judge panel in Bluman was au-
thored by Judge Brett Kavanaugh (long before he was nominated by Presi-
dent Trump, and narrowly confirmed by the U.S. Senate, to the Supreme 
Court).  After setting out the circumstances facing Bluman and Steinman, 
the district court had to decide what level of scrutiny to apply to Section 
441e.202  The plaintiffs argued their desired activity constituted protected 
speech and that strict scrutiny should apply.203  By contrast, the FEC argued 
that Section 441e amounted to a congressional pronouncement on foreign 
affairs and that rational basis scrutiny should apply.204  The issue was more 
complicated than either party acknowledged because Section 441e applied 
limits to both contributions and expenditures, which were traditionally sub-
ject to different levels of scrutiny under the First Amendment.205 
Ultimately, the court reasoned that Section 441e should be upheld even 
under strict scrutiny.  But in coming to that conclusion, the court made an 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Id.  
 203.  Id.  
 204. Id.  
 205.  Id. at 285–86.  
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interesting move.  Rather than engage in the First Amendment campaign fi-
nance arguments advanced by the plaintiffs, the court ruled that this case 
“does not implicate those debates.”206  Instead, this case raised “a prelimi-
nary and foundational question about the definition of the American political 
community, and, in particular, about the role of foreign citizens in the U.S. 
electoral process.”207  Framing the issue this way, the court proceeded to 
summarize the many cases in which foreigners were provided the same con-
stitutional rights as U.S. citizens,208 as well as the many cases in which for-
eigners had been denied the rights that U.S. citizens enjoy.209  These denied 
rights included the right to vote, serve on a jury, become a police or proba-
tion officer, and work as a public school teacher.210  The line between these 
cases was that the activities from which foreigners were barred “intimately 
relate to the process of democratic self-government.”211 
After reviewing the case law, the court in Bluman stated what it called a 
“straightforward principle”: “It is fundamental to the definition of our politi-
cal community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to par-
ticipate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic self-
government.”212  This bar included “preventing foreign influence over the 
U.S. political process.”213  With the issue presented this way, the question 
the court tried to answer was whether political contributions and express ad-
vocacy expenditures were part of democratic self-government.  And its an-
swer was that they were.214  “Political contributions and express-advocacy 
expenditures are an integral aspect of the process by which Americans elect 
officials to federal, state, and local government offices,” the court reasoned, 
given that such contributions and expenditures “finance advertisements, get-
out-the-vote drives, rallies, candidate speeches, and the myriad other activi-
ties by which candidates appeal to potential voters.”215 
There were several curious aspects of Bluman.  One was that the opinion 
 
 206.  Id. at 286.  
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id. at 286–87.  
 209.  Id. at 287.  
 210.  Id.  
 211.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 212.  Id. at 288.  
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. (stating that “[w]e think it evident that these campaign activities are part of the overall 
process of democratic self-government”).  
 215.  Id.  
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approvingly quoted the four dissenters in Citizens United to support the view 
that the government may impose restrictions on the right of foreigners to 
make contributions or expenditures in American elections.216  Even though 
the majority in Citizens United expressly stated that it was not addressing 
this issue, Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion explained how it found Justice Ste-
vens’s dissent “to be a telling and accurate indicator of where the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence stands on the question of foreign contributions and 
expenditures.”217  Second, the court in Bluman expressly limited its ruling to 
express advocacy expenditures made by foreigners and refused to forbid for-
eigner nationals from engaging in issue advocacy.  The court made it clear 
that Section 441e “does not restrain foreign nationals from speaking out 
about issues or spending money to advocate their points of view about is-
sues.”218  This would become a cause for concern later on.   
Third, the court defined the relevant political community from which 
foreign nationals were banned as “the American political community.”219  
Rather than view the case through the prism of the First Amendment, the 
court explained how this case “raises a preliminary and foundational ques-
tion about the definition of the American political community.”220  And in 
explaining why lawful permanent residents were not foreign nationals, the 
court highlighted how “Congress may reasonably conclude that lawful per-
manent residents of the United States stand in a different relationship to the 
American political community than other foreign citizens do.”221  In empha-
sizing the American political community as the relevant unit of analysis, 
Bluman’s main achievement was to solidify the idea that campaign finance 
nationalism should govern throughout the United States. 
When the plaintiffs argued that the right to speak about elections was 
different from the right to vote in them—and that Section 441e’s long-
standing ban on contributions and expenditures should not be justified under 
the First Amendment given that the statute’s restrictions were tied to speech 
and not the activity of voting—the court did not buy the argument: “The 
 
 216.  Id. at 289 (quoting Citizen United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 420–23, 424 n.1 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that measures keeping foreigners out of the 
electoral process “have been a part of U.S. campaign finance law for many years”)).  
 217.  Id.  
 218.  Id. at 290.  
 219.  Id. at 286, 290. 
 220.  Id. at 286. 
 221. Id. at 291–92.  
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statute does not serve a compelling interest in limiting the participation of 
non-voters in the activities of democratic self-government; it serves the 
compelling interest of limiting the participation of non-Americans in the ac-
tivities of democratic self-government.”222  The court further clarified that 
the compelling interest that justifies restraining foreigners from participating 
in American elections “does not apply equally to minors, corporations, and 
citizens of other states and municipalities”223 because these “are all members 
of the American political community.”224  In other words, foreigners could 
be prevented from participating in American campaign finance, but citizens 
of other states could not.  Again, this reasoning would soon form the intel-
lectual linchpin of American campaign finance nationalism. 
Academic commentators have largely been supportive of Bluman’s re-
sult, even if they have been critical of its reasoning.  Many were unsurprised 
that the Supreme Court decided to summarily affirm Bluman rather than of-
fer a full-blown opinion to justify the result.225  Bluman’s fiercest critic has 
been Professor Richard Hasen, who argues that endorsing the constitution-
ality of Section 441e in the same breath as the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Citizen United leads to incoherence in campaign finance doctrine.226  Hasen 
has attacked several conservative lawyers who advance robust views of the 
First Amendment for what he believes is their inconsistent endorsement of 
Citizens United and Bluman.227  He includes James Bopp, Floyd Abrams, 
and Bradley Smith in this camp.228  For his part, Professor Smith believes 
that Bluman and Citizens United are not inconsistent,229 and he personally 
comes out as “more or less agnostic on the result in Bluman.”230 
Other commentators wrestle with the case’s nuances in light of their im-
pact on the American campaign finance system.  In an important article, Pro-
 
 222.  Id. at 290.  
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id.  
 225.  See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Campaign Finance, Federalism, and the Case of the Long-Armed 
Donor, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 77, 83 n.36 (2014) (calling the Supreme Court’s decision to 
issue only a summary affirmance of the lower court’s decision “unsurprising”).  
 226.  Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, supra note 17, at 605–10. 
 227.  HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 18, at 10–11, 113–17. 
 228.  Id. at 113–17. 
 229.  Bradley A. Smith, The Academy, Campaign Finance, and Free Speech Under Fire, 25 J. L. 
& POL’Y 227, 246–47 n.96 (2016).  
 230. Id.  Professor Smith elaborates to say that, “because I do not consider it, as a practical matter, 
a very important case, I have not worried too much about sorting out my concerns . . . .  [A]s an em-
pirical matter I am not terribly worried about foreign money damaging our democracy today.”  Id.  
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fessor Anthony Johnstone explains one possible take-away from the case: 
“While no foreign actors have the right to participate in any national politi-
cal process, according to the logic of current doctrine all national actors 
would appear to have the right to participate in all state political processes 
beyond voting.”231  That analysis is perceptive and fairly accurate.   
Where such a state of affairs is the norm, however, federalism suffers.  
Federalism calls for borders to exist not only between the different states, 
but also between the states as a whole and the national government.232  No 
form of federalism can work without some limits being put in place to re-
strict the influence that outside actors have over the internal affairs of any 
given state.233  While the plaintiffs in Bluman framed their claims in terms of 
the First Amendment, and the court instead reframed the case as being about 
the confines of the American political community, neither side saw that the 
case could also concern a third issue: namely, American federalism.  In 
short, while upholding the restriction on foreigners from participating in our 
campaign finance system, Bluman failed to offer a view on what activities 
the states, as their own political communities, might reserve for their own 
residents, apart from voting and holding office.  The logic here should be 
apparent.  After all, some would-be campaign contributors come from out-
side a state’s political community, even if, under Bluman, they happen to 
come from the American political community.  Several states have under-
stood nonresident contributors to come from separate political communities 
and have tried to ban out-of-state residents from funding their elections.  Our 
campaign finance nationalism has not made their efforts easy. 
 
 231.  Anthony Johnstone, Outside Influence, 13 ELECTION L.J. 117, 119 (2014). 
 232.  Id. at 122; see also Patrick M. Garry et. al, Raising the Question of Whether Out-Of-State 
Political Contributions May Affect a Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the South 
Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35, 36 (2010) (explaining how “the federal-
ism structure in the American political system presumes not only that states occupy a separate level 
of authority from that of the federal government, but also that each state retains its own independ-
ence and autonomy from every other state”).  
 233.  Johnstone, supra note 231, at 122–23 (explaining how “[n]o form of federalism, and there-
fore no form of government under the Constitution, works without limits on outside influence in the 
states”). 
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IV. THE LIFE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE NATIONALISM 
A. Challenges to Nonresident Contribution Limits 
Our campaign finance nationalism has several consequences.  One is 
that it prevents the states from prohibiting nonresidents from making cam-
paign contributions to local political candidates.  Four states have tried to 
impose a semblance of federalism in their state campaign finance systems by 
passing statutes that impose limits on nonresident contributions. These stat-
utes have sought to bar out-of-state residents from influencing a state’s elec-
tions and local politics.234  In three states that have imposed such limits—
Oregon, Alaska, and Vermont—these statutes have been struck down.235  In 
the fourth state, Hawaii, the prohibition on nonresident contributions is still 
good law, though it may not be for long.236 
A small movement to ban nonresident contributions emerged in the mid-
1990s, when several small states tried to limit the ability of their elected of-
ficials to receive campaign contributions from beyond their borders.237  All 
of the states that imposed such bans did so using a similar strategy,238  in 
each case proceeding through indirect means.239  Rather than place limits on 
what nonresident contributors could give, they adopted laws to regulate what 
in-state candidates could accept.240  On their face, these laws targeted in-
state candidates, not out-of-state contributors.  The laws also did not bar all 
 
 234.  See OR. CONST. art. II, § 22 (1994) (limiting contributions from outside of the district in 
which the candidate is running to 10% of one’s total campaign funding); ALASKA STAT. § 
15.13.072(a)(3), (e) (1997) (limiting the amount candidates can accept from outside of the state to 
$3000 to $20,000, depending on the office sought, and banning contributions from groups organized 
outside of the state); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2805(c) (2012) (limiting contributions from outside of 
the state to 25% of a candidate’s total contributions). 
 235.  See VanNatta v. Kiesling, 899 F. Supp. 488 (D. Or. 1995), aff’d sub nom. VanNatta v. 
Kiesling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (striking down Oregon’s nonresident contribution ban); 
Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (striking down Alaska’s ban); Landell v. Sor-
rell, 382 F.3d 92 (2nd Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 
(2006) (striking down Vermont’s ban).  
 236.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (2010) (limiting contributions from outside of Hawaii to 30% 
of a candidate’s total contributions during an election period). 
 237.  See Ben Wallace, A Vote Against State Nonresident Contribution Limits, 78 LA L. REV. 597, 
605–06 (2018).  
 238.  Id. (reviewing the strategies used by these states). 
 239.  See id. at 606. 
 240.  See id. 
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outside contributions, but only those exceeding a set limit or ceiling.241  Typ-
ically, they prohibited in-state candidates from receiving nonresident contri-
butions over a specific dollar amount,242 or else a certain percentage above 
what the candidate’s total in-state contributions might have been.243 
In some cases, local governments have also tried to impose restrictions 
on nonresident contributions.  For instance, Akron, Ohio, tried to amend its 
charter to limit the percentage of a candidate’s funds that could be raised 
from contributors outside the city’s limits.244  A federal district court struck 
down the city’s plans.245  Austin, Texas, tried another tactic when it imposed 
an aggregate limit on contributions that came from outside Austin.  Austin’s 
city code prohibited candidates from accepting an aggregate total of more 
than $30,000 per election (and $20,000 in the case of a runoff) from sources 
“other than natural persons eligible to vote in a postal zip code completely or 
partially within the Austin city limits.”246  When a former city councilman 
challenged these limits, claiming they forced him to change campaign tactics 
when he could no longer solicit contributions from outside the Austin ar-
ea,247 a federal court dismissed his complaint for lack of standing, a decision 
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.248   
The most significant laws restricting nonresident contributions are those 
that have been proposed at the state level.249  Four states have passed laws 
restricting nonresident contributions, but these laws have not fared well in 
the courts.250  In 1994, Oregon became the first state to impose such limits.251  
Oregon’s voters passed a ballot initiative that amended the state’s constitu-
 
 241. See id. 
 242.  See id. 
 243.  See id. at 606 n.53 (making these points). 
 244.  See Frank v. City of Akron, 95 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D. Ohio 1999), rev’d in part, 290 F.3d 
813 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 245.  Id. at 723 n.3 (explaining that such a provision is unconstitutional and would have the effect 
of prohibiting certain people, such as those who happened to work in the City of Akron but reside 
elsewhere, from contributing to their preferred candidate). 
 246.  See AUSTIN, TEX. CODE, Art. III, § 8(A)(3) (1997).  The limits of $30,000 and $20,000 were 
also adjusted for inflation, and they had risen to be $36,000 and $24,000, respectively, when this 
nonresident provision was challenged in court in 2015.  See Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 
378, 382 (5th Cir. 2018).  
 247.  Id. at 389. 
 248.  Id. at 388–90.  
 249.  See Wallace, supra note 237, at 607. 
 250. Id. 
 251.  Id.  
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tion to prohibit political candidates from receiving significant out-of-district 
(not out-of-state) contributions.252  The purpose was to “prevent out-of-
district individuals and organizations from buying influence in [Oregon’s] 
elections, thus allowing ‘ordinary people [to] secure their rightful control of 
their own government.’”253 The initiative consisted of four directives.  The 
first allowed political candidates to take only contributions which originated 
from individuals who were residents of the electoral district of the public of-
fice being sought when the contribution was made.254  The second punished 
a candidate who accepted more than 10% of his contributions from outside 
of the district by preventing that candidate from holding public office for a 
period of time twice as long as the tenure of the office sought.255  The third 
prevented in-district residents from contributing funds on behalf of out-of-
district residents.256  The fourth made violating this scheme a felony.257 
In VanNatta v. Keisling, a federal district court struck down Oregon’s 
scheme on First Amendment grounds.258  The district court found that the 
initiative burdened political speech and the freedom of association, and that 
it could not survive strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to 
prevent “corruption or the appearance of corruption.”259  The court gave sev-
eral reasons why this was so.  First, the initiative prevented non-corrupt, out-
of-district contributors from associating with candidates running for state of-
fice.260  Arguing that elected officials in state offices impact all state resi-
dents, not just the residents within a candidate’s district,261  the court was 
troubled by how Oregon’s scheme “impairs out-of-district residents from as-
sociating with a candidate for state office who, if elected, will have a real 
and direct impact on those persons.”262  Second, the initiative did not thwart 
 
 252. OR. CONST. art II, § 22 (1994), invalidated by VanNatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488 (D. 
Or. 1995).  Oregon’s new law specifically targeted contributions from “out-of-district” residents, as 
opposed to out-of-state residents.  Id.  
 253.  VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 491. 
 254.  Id. at 491. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id.; see also id. at 493 (“Sections 1 and 2 of Measure 6 [Oregon’s initiative] prohibit candi-
dates from accepting out-of-district contributions, whereas Sections 3 and 4 criminalize donations 
made by in-district residents on behalf of out-of-district contributors.”). 
 258.  Id. at 491.  
 259.  Id. at 496–97 (citation omitted). 
 260.  Id. at 497. 
 261.  Id. 
 262. Id. 
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so-called “in-district corruption,” because it did not prevent a candidate from 
receiving money from corrupt constituents of his district.263  Finally, the ini-
tiative did nothing to prevent large contributions from outside an electoral 
district, so long as they amounted to less than 10% of a legislator’s total con-
tributions.264  In other words, candidates who were strong fundraisers could 
still be swayed by “outside special interests” and corruption because there 
was no dollar limit in terms of how much outsiders could give.265 
In 1996, shortly after Oregon enacted its constitutional amendment, 
Alaska passed a bill to limit nonresident contributions as well.266  Alaskans 
were about to vote on an initiative to reform their state’s campaign finance 
system, and the bill was a response not only to the impending initiative be-
fore the state’s voters but also to the greater concerns about corruption being 
voiced by the public.267  The legislative history of Alaska’s law is telling.268  
The state’s legislature was worried that organized special interests were re-
sponsible for raising a significant portion of all election campaign funds in 
the state, which meant these interests had the ability to exert influence over 
elected officials.269  The new law’s purpose was “to substantially revise 
Alaska’s election campaign finance laws in order to restore the public’s trust 
in the electoral process and to foster good government.”270  This was im-
portant because candidates in Alaska could previously convert campaign 
funds to personal income, which fostered bribery and corruption.271 
Alaska’s new law prohibited candidates, groups, or political parties from 
receiving contributions from out-of-state residents if they exceeded specific 
dollar limits.272  A candidate seeking the office of governor or lieutenant 
governor could accept only $20,000 in out-of-state contributions in a calen-
dar year.273  A candidate for the state senate could accept only $5,000,274 and 
a candidate for state representative or municipal offices could only seek 
 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (1997). 
 267.  See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 601 (Alaska 1999). 
 268.  See id.  
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072. 
 273.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072(e)(1). 
 274.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072(e)(2). 
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$3,000.275  In addition, political parties could accept no more than 10% of 
their individual contributions from out-of-state donors per year.276 
In 1999, these out-of-state contribution limits were upheld by the Alaska 
Supreme Court in State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union.277  The plaintiff in 
the case, the Alaska Civil Liberties Union, relied on VanNatta v. Keisling in 
challenging these limits, but the Alaska Supreme Court found VanNatta dis-
tinguishable, in that Oregon’s out-of-district contribution restrictions bur-
dened both residents and nonresidents of the state,278  while Alaska’s re-
strictions did not burden any Alaska residents.279  The court also found that 
Alaska’s restrictions were less burdensome on nonresident contributors be-
cause, unlike Oregon, Alaska did not share a contiguous border with any 
other state.280  The court explained how Alaskans had the power to preserve 
their own unique political community by excluding nonresidents from vot-
ing.281  This power was “self-evident,”282 and although the court had “not 
previously affirmed the authority of the state to limit the influence of nonres-
idents over state elections through regulation of their campaign contribu-
tions,” it found that “such an extension would not be illogical.”283 
Alaska’s law stood for over twenty years, altered only by a 2006 initia-
tive that further revised the limits set by the legislature and the voters in 
1996.284  In 2018, however, Alaska’s out-of-state contribution limits were 
challenged again, this time in federal court.285  This time, a federal district 
court upheld the nonresident contribution limits,286 but, in Thompson v. Heb-
 
 275.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072(e)(3). 
 276.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072(f). 
 277.  978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999). 
 278.  Id. at 616–17. 
 279.  Id. at 616 (describing how Alaska’s law only applies to nonresidents and does not limit the 
speech of any Alaskans, including those most likely to be affected by the outcome of a campaign). 
 280. Id. 
 281.  See id. (noting that each state has an obligation to preserve its own political community). 
 282.  Id. at 616 n.123 (stating that “[t]he state’s power to preserve the political community by ex-
cluding nonresidents from voting is self-evident”). 
 283.  Id.  Despite the fact that the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Alaska Civil Liber-
ties Union stood in conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in VanNatta v. Keisling, both cases 
were denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.  See Andrew Hyman, Alaska Gives Ninth Circuit the 
Cold Shoulder: Conflicts in Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1456 
(2004). 
 284.  See 2006 Alaska Laws Initiative Meas. 1, § 1. 
 285.  Thompson v. Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Alaska 2016).  
 286.  Id. at 1040. 
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don, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and struck 
them down.287  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Alaska’s law did not further 
the state’s important interest in preventing corruption or its appearance, as 
required to survive a First Amendment challenge; at most, the law “aime[d] 
to curb perceived ‘undue influence’ of out-of-state contributors,” which was 
not a sufficient interest for restricting campaign contributions.288  
Vermont became the third state to impose nonresident contribution lim-
its when it passed a statute with a provision that prevented state candidates 
from receiving more than 25% of their total campaign contributions from 
nonresidents.289  When the statute was challenged in federal district court on 
First Amendment grounds, this provision was struck down.290  In Landell v. 
Sorrell, the district court explained that most candidates would be “unaffect-
ed or only slightly affected by the limit on out-of-state contributions,”291 be-
cause the percentages of out-of-state contributions received had traditionally 
been very low in Vermont.  The percentage of out-of-state contributions that 
the average candidate for Vermont’s lower house received was 2.2% in 
1998, 2.6% in 1996, and 1.7% in 1994.292  In races for Vermont’s upper 
house, the percentage of out-of-state contributions received by the average 
candidate was 9% in 1998, 9% in 1996, and 7.5% in 1994.293 
The state argued that limits on out-of-state contributions combat the 
perception that the Vermont legislature might be unduly influenced by out-
of-staters, but the district court found this argument “not well focused.”294  
The state’s justification did not account for the fact that people outside of 
Vermont might have a legitimate interest in Vermont politics, and thus a 
right to participate in Vermont’s elections.295  Many individuals from outside 
of Vermont, such a second homeowners, were influenced by Vermont’s 
 
 287.  Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (striking down Alaska’s nonresi-
dent contribution limits). 
 288.  Id. at 1041.  
 289.  See 1997 Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act (“Act 64”) (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17, § 2805(c) (2012)) (“A candidate, political party or political committee shall not accept, in any 
two-year general election cycle, more than 25 percent of total contributions from contributors who 
are not residents of the state of Vermont or from political committees or parties not organized in the 
state of Vermont.”).  
 290.  Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000).  
 291.  Id. at 472.  
 292.  Id.  
 293.  Id. at 472–73. 
 294.  Id. at 484.  
 295.  Id.  
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laws, and they may well “have legitimate interests in Vermont politics and 
policy,” the court explained.296  Because the court had no evidence before it 
to suggest that out-of-state contributions were any more corrupting than 
those that came from inside the state, it stuck down Vermont’s law.297  The 
court cited VanNatta and explained how the provision of Vermont’s law re-
stricting nonresident contributions was not narrowly tailored.298 
The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling in Landell,299 explaining that it 
could “find no sufficiently important governmental interest” to support the 
provision of Vermont’s law that limited out-of-state contributions to 25% of 
all candidate contributions.300  As the Second Circuit went on to explain, 
“the out-of-state contribution limit isolates one group of people (non-
residents) and denies them the equivalent First Amendment rights enjoyed 
by others (Vermont residents).”301  The First Amendment did not permit 
state governments to preserve their politics from the influence of outsid-
ers.302  The Second Circuit also reviewed the Oregon statute struck down in 
VanNatta and the Alaska statute upheld Alaska Civil Liberties Union, and it 
looked disapprovingly at how the “analysis in the Alaska case is a sharp de-
parture from the corruption analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Buck-
ley.”303  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but at this stage the parties 
were no longer disputing the lower courts’ holdings on the constitutionality 
of Vermont’s out-of-state contribution limits, and thus the Supreme Court 
was not provided with an opportunity to address this issue.304 
Hawaii was the last state to adopt a statute limiting contributions from 
nonresident donors.305  The 2010 version of that statute limited out-of-state 
contributions to 30% of a candidate’s total contributions during an election 
period,306 with exemptions made for contributions from family members.307  
 
 296.  Id. at 470.  
 297. Id. at 484.  
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2nd Cir. 2002).  
 300.  Id. at 146. 
 301.  Id.. 
 302.  Id. at 148.  
 303.  Id.  
 304.  See Randell v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 239 (2006) (explaining how “the lower courts held . . . 
out-of-state contribution limits unconstitutional, and the parties do not challenge that holding”). 
 305. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (2010).  
 306.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362(a) (“Contributions from all persons who are not residents of the 
State at the time the contributions are made shall not exceed thirty per cent of the total contributions 
received by a candidate or candidate committee for each election period.”).  
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As of this writing, Hawaii’s statute is still good law, although how long that 
status quo will stand is anybody’s guess.  The statute has not yet been chal-
lenged in the courts.  Indeed, in 2019, Hawaii’s state senate introduced a bill 
to amend the state’s statute so that it now requires contributions from non-
residents that exceed the applicable 30% limit to escheat back to the Hawaii 
election campaign fund if they are not returned to the contributor within 30 
days.  The fact that Hawaii’s legislature recently sought to amend this statute 
provides some evidence that the state’s lawmakers believe it is constitution-
al.  Yet given the precedent established with similar legislation in Oregon, 
Alaska, and Vermont, Hawaii’s statute seems ripe for challenge. 
B. The Growing Influence of Nonresident Contributions 
The inability of the states to limit nonresident contributions is not the 
only consequence of our campaign finance nationalism.  The system has also 
created a regime in which political candidates running for both federal and 
state office continuously feel the need to seek money from contributors 
across the country.  Over time, candidates develop two distinct groups to 
whom they owe allegiance: voters and donors.  Professor Richard Briffault 
refers to these as “constituents” and “contributors,” and he explains why it is 
troubling that they may not constitute the same people.308  Contributors, es-
pecially when they do not reside in the lawmaker’s electoral district, may 
possess very different goals from constituents—indeed, a lawmaker’s re-
sponsiveness to them may not be in his constituents’ interests.309 
Research shows that the funding provided to our lawmakers increasingly 
comes from contributors who are not their constituents.310  Janet Grenzke 
conducted a study of the campaign contributions made to federal congress-
men in the late 1970s and early 1980s and found that more than half of the 
reportable individual contributions to long-term members of Congress came 
from outside of their districts, even though, at the time, most non-district 
contributions still came from within the state.311  Grenzke’s study found that 
 
 307.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362(b) (“This section shall not be applicable to contributions from the 
candidate's immediate family.”). 
 308.  Briffault, supra note 9, at 31. 
 309.  Id.  
 310.  Id. at 32 (finding that “non-constituents provide the bulk of itemized individual contribu-
tions—that is, donations of $200 or more—to candidates for Congress”). 
 311.  See Janet Grenzke, Comparing Contributions to U.S. House Members from Outside Their 
Districts, 13 LEG. STUD. Q. 82, 85–86 (1988).  Grenzke’s study looked only at individual contribu-
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the percentage of within-district and within-state contributions had steadily 
declined with successive election cycles.312  In 1977–1978, 48% of contribu-
tions made to long-term members of Congress in the amount of $500 or 
more came from outside of their congressional districts.313  By 1979–1980, 
53% of contributions of $500 or more came from outside of the district, and 
by 1981–1982 that figure had jumped to 61%.314 
Twenty years after Grenzke’s study, another study of outside campaign 
contributions was conducted by James Gimpel, Francis Lee, and Shana 
Pearson-Merkowitz.  These authors found that between 1996 and 2000, the 
average congressional campaign received 63% of its individual contributions 
from outside of the candidate’s district.315  By 2002, that figure was 68%, 
although in 2004 it dipped slightly to 67%.316  Not only did the percentage of 
outside contributions rise for the average congressman, but so did the num-
ber of outside districts from which they were received.  In 1996, this study 
found, the average number of outside districts from which campaign contri-
butions came stood at 55.317  By 2004, these contributions came from 70 
other districts on average.318  In most cases, these outside districts were lo-
cated far away.  Only 22% of the individual itemized contributions in the 
average congressional race came from adjacent districts, while 45% came 
from far-away districts not adjacent to the recipient’s district.319 
The latest statistics concerning outside contributions to federal candi-
dates come from the 2018 election cycle.  According to the Center for Re-
sponsive Politics, in 2018 candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives 
received an average of 73.8% of their contributions from outside of their dis-
 
tions of more than $100, as contributions of less than that amount did not trigger disclosure at the 
time.  For her data, Grenzke examined contributions made to the 154 members of the House of Rep-
resentatives who had served continuously from 1973 to 1982, as well as contributions made to 18 
additional members of the House who had served continuously from 1973 to 1980.  Id. at 84. 
 312.  Id. at 85. 
 313. Id.. 
 314.  Id..  Grenzke found that two factors determined which congressional incumbents benefitted 
most from out-of-district contributions: the lawmaker’s liberalism, and the lawmaker’s power over 
the legislative agenda.  See id. at 89 (“The proportion of out-of-district contributions is higher for 
liberal legislators and for legislators with power over legislation that is national in scope.”). 
 315.  See James G. Gimpel et al., The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Con-
gressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 378 (2008).  
 316.  Id. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  Id. at 378–79. 
[Vol. 46: 759, 2019] Our Campaign Finance Nationalism 
  PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
799 
tricts.320  In 2016, the equivalent figure for outside contributions stood at 
64.9%,321 and in 2014 it was 61.2%.322  When only current House members 
are included in the data for 2018, it turns out 71.9% of their contributions 
came from outside of their districts.323  In 2016, the equivalent figure for cur-
rent House members was 67.1%,324 and in 2014 it was 66.3%.325  The evi-
dence clearly shows that the percentage of contributions made to federal 
candidates by nonresidents has greatly increased over the years, and it con-
tinues to increase with each successive election cycle. 
Some House members receive almost all of their contributions from out-
side of their districts.  In 2018, as Table 1 shows, the number of House 
members who received 80% or more of their itemized contributions from 
outside of their congressional districts stood at 143 (32.87% of the House’s 
total membership).326  That number, an all-time high, rose from 119 mem-
bers in 2016 (27.36%), 98 members in 2014 (22.52%), and 88 members in 
2012 (20.23%).327  In 2018, 65 members of House (14.94% of the total) re-
ceived an astounding 90% or more of their contributions from outside of 
their districts.328  The equivalent figure stood at 38 members in 2016 
 
 320.  See In-District v. Out-of-District: All House Candidates, Election Cycle 2018, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2018&display=A (last 
visited on May 22, 2019).  The data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics examined only 
itemized individual contributions of $200 or more given to a federal candidate, and only candidates 
who received a minimum of $50,000 in itemized individual contributions were included. The figures 
were based on Federal Election Commission data covering the 2017-2018 election cycle.  Id. 
 321.  In-District v. Out-of-District: All House Candidates, Election Cycle 2016, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL.), https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2016&display=A (last 
visited on May 22, 2019). 
 322.  In-District v. Out-of-District: All House Candidates, Election Cycle 2014, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2014&display=A (last 
visited on May 22, 2019). 
 323. In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2018, supra note 
320. 
 324. In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2016, supra note 
321. 
 325. In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2014, supra note 
322. 
 326. See In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. 
(last visited May 22, 2019), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2012&display=M. The numbers and per-
centages provided in this paragraph are based on the author’s calculations from data provided by the 
Center for Responsive Politics for the 2012-2018 elections cycles.  
 327. Id. 
 328. Id.  
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(8.74%), 40 members in 2014 (9.19%), and 33 members in 2012 (7.58%).329   
It is evident that these numbers have increased with each election cycle. 
 
TABLE 1: OUTSIDE CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. HOUSE MEMBERS, 2012—2018 
Year à 2012 2014 2016 2018 
# receiving at 
least 80% from 
outside of district 
88 98 119 143 
% of House 
membership 20.23% 22.52% 27.36% 32.87% 
# receiving at 
least 90% from 
outside of district 
33 40 38 65 
% of House 
membership 7.58% 9.19% 8.74% 14.94% 
 
The data on outside contributions comes from the Center for Responsive 
Politics. This data also classifies a few congressional candidates as receiving 
100% of their contributions from outside of their districts.  In 2018, there 
were 239 of these candidates in total.  Of course, the vast majority of these 
candidates managed to raise very little money and probably had little to no 
chance of ever winning election.  However, that was not true in every case; 
at least one candidate in 2018 who raised 100% of his contributions from 
outside of his district beat an incumbent.330  In 2016, another candidate who 
raised 100% from outside of his district also won election.331  In general, 
 
 329. Id. 
 330.  Current Representative T.J. Cox, a Democrat who ran for Congress in 2018 in California’s 
21st Congressional District against incumbent Republican David Valadao, raised $2,927,765, report-
ing $2,005,667 of it in itemized contributions—100% of which came from outside of the district.  
See In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2018, supra note 320.  
Cox wound up winning his race against Valadao, who raised $3,279,453 and reported $1,670,482 in 
itemized contributions—73% of which came from outside of the district. See California District 21 
2018 Race: Summary Data, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?id=CA21&cycle=2018 (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 331.  In 2016, Republican incumbent Ted Budd ran against Democratic challenger Bruce Davis in 
North Carolina’s 13th Congressional District. Budd raised $594,297, including $333,598 in itemized 
contributions—100% of which came from outside the congressional district.  See In-District v. Out-
of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2016, supra note 321; see also North Caro-
lina District 13 2016 Race: Summary Data, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?id=NC13&cycle= 2016 (last visited May 26, 2019). 
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raising all of one’s campaign funds from outside of one’s district may not be 
a recipe for success, but the data clearly shows that raising a significant por-
tion of funds from outside is common, and perhaps necessary, in today’s 
politics. 
The Center for Responsive Politics also reports on a category of candi-
dates who raised most of their contributions from within their districts.  Back 
in 2012, a total of seven candidates raised 80% or more of their itemized 
contributions from within their districts.332  One of these candidates was Be-
to O’Rourke, who raised a total of $477,292 in itemized contributions in 
2012, the first year he was elected to Congress—88% of which came from 
within his district.333  In 2014, nine candidates raised 80% or more in contri-
butions within their districts and in 2016 six candidates did so.334  In each of 
these years, most of these candidates were incumbents in very safe districts.  
But by 2018, times had changed.  In 2018, the number of candidates who 
raised at least 80% of their money within their districts had gone up to 18, 
but none of them were incumbents and hardly any were victorious.335 
These statistics suggest that very few successful candidates in this day 
and age raise significant funds within the districts they represent, and that 
our campaign finance system has now become almost entirely national.  This 
 
 332.  See In-District v. Out-of-District: Most- In-District (Current Candidates Only): 2012 Elec-
tion Cycle, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?cycle=2012&display=T (last visited May 26, 
2019). 
 333.  Id.  Of the seven candidates who raised 80% or more of their contributions from within their 
districts in 2012, four were already incumbents, including Mac Thornberry (R-TX, District 13—94% 
of his itemized contributions came from within his district), Mo Brooks (R-AL, District 5—89%), 
John A. Yarmuth (D-KY, District 3—84%), and Louis Gohmert, Jr. (R-TX, District 1—83%).  Six 
of these seven “80% or more” candidates won their races that year, including non-incumbents Beto 
O’Rourke (D-TX, District 16—88%) and Tom Rice (R-SC, District 7—87%).  Id.   
 334. See In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2014, supra 
note 322; In-District v. Out-of-District: Most In-District (Current Candidates Only): Election Cycle, 
2016, supra note 321; In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 
2016, supra note 321. 
 335.  The one exception was Republican Tim Burchette, who was elected to Congress from Ten-
nessee’s 2nd Congressional District in 2018.  Buchette raised a total of $1,080,763, of which 
$967,242 came in itemized contributions (85% of it from within the district).  He was one of two 
congressional candidates who raised at least $500,000 in contributions from constituents of his own 
district.  The other was Democrat Courtney Tritch, who ran in Indiana’s 3rd Congressional District 
but lost her race.  See In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 
2018, supra note 320; Tennessee District 02 2018 Race: Summary Data, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE 
POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?id=TN02&cycle=2018 (last visited May 26, 
2019); Indiana District 03 2018 Race: Summary Data, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?id=IN03&cycle=2018 (last visited May 26, 2019). 
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situation is even more pronounced with respect to U.S. Senate elections.  
This is perhaps to be expected given the higher national profile and name 
recognition that many U.S. Senators enjoy.  In contrast to most House races, 
which take place in gerrymandered districts, the electoral “district” for each 
Senator consists of the state he represents.  Thus the relevant data comes 
from comparing in-state versus out-of-state contributions to Senate candi-
dates.  In most cases, given the high cost of winning a Senate seat, these to-
tals are much larger than the amounts raised by House candidates.336 
One might expect Senators to receive even more of their contributions 
from out of state, but the picture that emerges in the Senate is mixed.  The 
Center for Responsive Politics reports that for incumbent Senators running 
for re-election in 2018, 41.9% of their contributions on average came from 
within state and 58.1% came from out of state.337  Thus the percent of out-
of-state contributions for Senators is lower than the average percent of out-
of-district contributions for House members, which stood at 71.9% in 2018.  
Nonetheless, in 2018, Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) received 96.2% of her item-
ized contributions from outside of North Dakota, and Doug Jones (D-AL) 
received 84.4% of his from outside of Alabama.338  The equivalent figures 
were 77.1% for Jon Tester (D-MT), 73.6% for Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), 
and 70.1% for Claire McCaskill (D-MO).339  On the other hand, Diane Fein-
stein (D-CA) received the majority of her itemized contributions—73.9%—
from California.340  All of these Senators managed to raise between $10 and 
$25 million, which is much more than members of the House raise.341 
The Senators and House members who are able to cast a wide geograph-
ical net when it comes to campaign contributions tend to have wider national 
profiles.  Studies show that the longer a lawmaker is in office and the more 
power he has over the legislative agenda, the more likely he is to raise a sub-
stantial percentage of campaign funds from outside of his district.342  The 
 
 336.  In 2016, the average cost of winning House seat was $1,518,021, and the average cost of 
winning a Senate was $10,464,068.  See Vital Statistics on Congress: Data on the U.S. Congress, 
Updated March 2019, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, tbl. 3-1 (March 4, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch3_full.pdf. 
 337.  See Top In-State vs. Out-of-State: 2018 Election Cycle, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/instvsout.php (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 338.  Id. 
 339.  Id. 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  Id.  
 342.  See, e.g., Grenzke, supra note 311, at 89, 94–95. Grenzke posits that one characteristic of 
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last time former House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) ran for election, in 2016, 
he raised more than $19 million in contributions, 99% of which came from 
outside of his Wisconsin district.343  Nancy Pelosi consistently raises a very 
high percentage of her contributions from outside of her district, despite the 
fact that she represents one of the wealthiest districts in the United States.344  
Pelosi raised 87% of her contributions in 2018 and 85% in 2016 from out-
side of her district, which includes most of the city of San Francisco.345 
Individual itemized contributions made to federal candidates represent 
only a portion of total money that candidates receive.  Other candidate 
committees, political party committees, and political action committees set 
up by corporations and unions (so-called PACs) are also able to make con-
tributions to federal candidates.346  Very rarely will these committees be lo-
cated in a particular candidate’s home district.  In addition, contributions can 
be made by citizens across the country to entities that make independent ex-
penditures to influence elections without coordinating with the candidate.  
Such independent expenditure groups include 504(c)(4) organizations and 
Super PACs.  The former entities are named after the section of the IRS 
Code that regulates their functioning.  504(c)(4) organizations are not re-
quired to disclose their contributors, meaning that the geographic location of 
their donors cannot easily be discerned.347 On the other hand, Super PACs 
must report and disclose their contributors.348   
 
legislators who receive a high proportion of out-of-district contributions is that they “have power 
over legislation that is national in scope.”  Id. at 89.  This is particularly the case when a member of 
the House of Representatives is able to translate his seniority into direct power over legislation.  Id. 
at 93. 
 343.  See In-District v. Out-of-District: All Current Representatives, Election Cycle 2016, supra 
note 321. 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  San Francisco’s 94104 zip code was the number one zip code from which political contribu-
tions were sent nationwide in 2014 (when it produced $73.7 million) and 2016 ($93.2 million).  In 
2018, it fell to number two ($75.2 million) behind New York City’s 10022 zip code ($102.7 mil-
lion). See Top Zip Codes, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topzips.php? cycle= 2018 (last visited on May 26, 2019). 
 346. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 37–38.  
 347.  See Katherine Shaw, Reorientating Disclosure Debates in the Post-Citizens United World, in 
DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 159–60 (Eugene D. 
Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018) (explaining that social welfare organizations established 
under Section 501(c)(4) or the Internal Revenue Code are allowed to participate in political activities 
and must report their expenditures made for political purposes, but not the contributions they re-
ceive).  
 348.  Id. at 160–61; Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1646 (2012) (explain-
ing that a “Super PAC is a political committee, registered with the FEC, and subject to the federal 
[Vol. 46: 759, 2019] Our Campaign Finance Nationalism 
  PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
804 
In recent years, expenditures by Super PACs have skyrocketed, in part 
because the law places no limits on how much donors can contribute to these 
entities.349  The maximum contribution that an individual can give to a fed-
eral candidate is $2,800 for the 2020 election cycle, but there are no re-
strictions on the amount that an individual can give to a Super PAC.  This 
makes Super PACs attractive to donors who wish to spend more to influence 
campaigns than the federal candidate contribution limits allow.350 
Contributions made to Super PACs are even more geographically dis-
connected than the contributions made directly to candidates.  The Center 
for Responsive Politics groups contributions to outside spending groups like 
Super PACs based on various different categories, including the donor’s lo-
cation.  In 2018, of the individuals contributing to these groups, $122.3 mil-
lion was given by Sheldon Adelson of Las Vegas; $92.9 million by Michael 
Bloomberg of New York City; and $72.4 million by Tom Steyer of San 
Francisco.  Rounding out the top ten, Richard Uihlein contributed $37 mil-
lion from Lake Forest, Illinois; James Simons $20.7 million from New York 
City; Kenneth Griffin $18.4 million from Chicago; Donald Sussman $13.9 
million from Rye Brook, New York; Stephen Scwarzmann $11.8 million 
from New York City; George Soros $10.9 million from New York City; and 
Jeff Bezos $10.1 million from Seattle, Washington.351  Although this money 
did not go to the candidates themselves, it directly impacted their campaigns.  
And, of course, it originated from concentrated wealth that was geograph-
ically disaggregated from the elections it was meant to influence.352 
 
organizational, registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements of other political committees”).  
In addition to Super PACs and 501(c) organizations, there is another kind of organization—called 
the 527 organization—that sometimes participates in independent spending in elections.  527 organi-
zations, like Super PACs, must publicly disclose their donors, although they disclose them to the 
IRS, not to the FEC.  Given that they are not required to register with the FEC, 527 organizations 
must avoid engaging in “express advocacy,” which refers to specifically calling for the election or 
defeat of a particular federal candidate.  Id. at 1648; see Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and 
the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949 (2005) (explaining how 527’s work). 
 349.  Briffault, Super PACs, supra note 348, at 1647. 
 350.  See Tyler S. Roberts, Enhanced Disclosure as a Response to Increased Out-of-State Spend-
ing in State and Local Elections, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137, 141 (2016).  
 351. See 2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www. opense-
crets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited May 
26, 2019).  
 352.  According to the Center for Responsive Politics, Super PACs raised $850,199,116 during the 
2018 election cycle.  Their top 100 donors nationally accounted for 77.7% of this money.  See Super 
PACs: How Many Donors Give, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-
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 The national aspects of our campaign finance system arguably make 
sense when it comes to federal candidates.  Federal candidates make laws 
that affect people across the country.  Whoever represents Texas in the U.S. 
Senate will have an opportunity to vote on laws that will impact every 
American, no matter where he lives.  But the system makes a lot less sense 
when it comes to state and local officials, who vote on laws affecting the 
people of their state.353  A state senator from Montana will pass laws that 
concern Montanans, and it is unclear why a donor who resides in North Car-
olina, Maine, or Louisiana should be able to contribute to his campaign. De-
spite this logic, the same campaign finance nationalism that applies at the 
federal level also applies at the state and local level.  Out-of-state contribu-
tions and out-of-state spending affect every level of government throughout 
the United States today.354  Out-of-state contributions accounted for an aver-
age of 23% of all donations made directly to gubernatorial candidates be-
tween 2007 and 2014.355  In 2013, when New Jersey and Virginia held gu-
bernatorial elections, 49% of contributions came from out of state.356  In 
2013, Terry McAuliffe received 68% of his contributions from out of state in 
his bid to become governor of Virginia.357  In 2012, Scott Walker received 
60% from out of state for the governor’s race in Wisconsin.358 
Attorney general races and state supreme court races likewise have re-
ceived their share of out-of-state spending recently.359  So have local mayor-
al races and city council race.  And then there is another type of contest that 
 
spending/donor-stats?cycle=2018&type=I (last visited on May 26, 2019); see also See 2018 Top 
Donors to Outside Spending Groups, supra note 351.  
 353.  See Briffault, supra note 9, at 38–39 (explaining how “[a]ll members of Congress in some 
sense represent all Americans so that non-constituents as well as constituents have a stake in the out-
come of a Senate race or a House district election” but finding that “[t]he growing role of out-of-
state and out-of-district contributions in state and local elections presents a different issue”). 
 354. See Roberts, supra note 350, at 140.  
 355.  Id. at 145. 
 356. Id.; see also J.T. Stepleton, Crossing the Line: Boosting Gubernatorial Candidates With Out-
of-State Contributions, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL., tbl. 2 (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/crossing-the-line-boosting-out-of-state-
contributions-to-gubernatorial-campaigns. 
 357.  J.T. Stepleton, supra note 356, at tbl. 4. 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Scott Greytak et al., Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2013-
2014, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 32 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Politics_of_Judicial_Electi
on_2013_2014.pdf (explaining that national groups are playing an increasing role in state judicial 
elections). 
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does not involve supporting a political candidate but that draws a larger pro-
portion of out-of-state money than any other election: ballot measures.360  
One-third of all the funds raised either to support or oppose statewide ballot 
measures conducted between 2010 and 2015 came from out of state.361 
The literature has only recently started paying attention to the usual ge-
ography of our campaign finance nationalism.362  Professor Briffault, in 
demonstrating how contributions from nonresidents have become increas-
ingly significant in American politics, argues that the growth of outside con-
tributors “reflects and reinforces the growing nationalization and partisan 
and ideological polarization of our elections at the federal, state, and local 
levels.”363  He and other commentators have criticized our campaign finance 
nationalism, lamenting a state of affairs that allows campaign contributions 
to flow across district and state lines.  But not all scholars find themselves in 
this camp.  Others have supported this system and even defended it, or at 
least aspects of it.364 Many scholars have undertaken efforts to understand 
the effects of nonresident spending and the justifications for it.  For instance, 
Professor Johnstone defends the political community principle in Bluman as 
an important exception to the universal speaker-neutrality rationale ad-
vanced by Citizens United. Johnstone accepts that contributions may come 
from outside electoral districts but not from foreigners.365   
Most scholars acknowledge that our campaign finance system creates a 
new constituency for politicians, one separate from the voters they repre-
sent.366  The problem with this new constituency is the effect it has on poli-
 
 360.  Roberts, supra note 350, at 150.  
 361.  Id. 
 362.  See Fontana, supra note 3, at 104 (explaining how, “[f]or those few scholars paying attention 
to the geography of campaign finance law, the details of where campaign finance contributions come 
from and where they go are largely ignored”).  Fontana further elaborates: “By and large, the intel-
lectual oxygen related to campaign finance law has been occupied by those focusing on the constitu-
tional dimensions of the power that the wealthy enjoy to shape federal elections.  The geography of 
campaign finance law is a conceptually different and prior problem.”  Id. at 104–05.  
 363.  Briffault, supra note 9, at 42. 
 364.  See Pettys, supra note 225, at 87–88 (arguing that geographically mobile voters “have an 
incentive to try to ensure that they will be comfortable with the prevailing regulatory regime no mat-
ter where they ultimately reside”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1077, 1082 (2014) (arguing that allowing one state’s citizen to engage in another’s politics strength-
ens federalism by allowing states to serve as a counterweight to the federal government); Wallace, 
supra note 237, at 625–27 (maintaining that allowing non-resident contributions preserves federal-
ism and strengthens the First Amendment). 
 365. Johnstone, supra note 231, at 120. 
 366.  Briffault, supra note 9, at 43 (explaining how, “[f]or better of worse, outside donors have 
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cymaking.  When a lawmaker receives a large portion of his war chest from 
outside of his district, it serves to shift that lawmaker’s policies so that they 
align closer to the wishes of his donors.  Over time, our campaign finance 
nationalism moves the policy positions of our legislators away from their 
median constituents to align more with their median contributors.367  The 
wealthy political donors and spenders who influence our elections are not at 
all representative of the American voting population.368  These donors tend 
to be significantly more conservative on economic issues, in their views on 
social welfare spending, and on issues like affirmative action.369 
Given the dissimilarities in the demographics of constituents and con-
tributors, the resulting misalignment in policy is not surprising.  This align-
ment problem has been documented by many scholars, and it is a significant 
consequence of the current system.370  Our campaign finance system leads to 
a situation where a politician has two masters, the voter and the donor; and 
one master possesses different policy preferences from the other.  Yet do-
nors tend to have more influence on legislative decision-making because 
most politicians cannot keep their jobs without them.  Candidates rely on 
wealthy donors to back their electoral campaigns.  Once elected, these can-
didates have no choice but to please the donors who supported them. The 
alternative is that they will not have enough money to run for re-election.371 
To battle the effects of outside money, a very weak form of campaign 
finance federalism has developed in the states.  It consists of the different 
state contribution limits that the states impose on various kinds of donors 
who participate in their state elections—individuals, parties, PACs, corpora-
tions, and unions.  The states apply these contribution limits regardless of 
 
become a new constituency, albeit one quite different from the usual meaning of the term”). 
 367. Another consequence of our campaign finance nationalism is that this system undermines the 
federalism of the states and their traditional role as laboratories of democratic experimentation.  See 
Roberts, supra note 350, at 159–60.  This happens when wealthy donors increasingly contribute and 
spend across state lines to pursue a national approach for solving local issues.  Id. at 164. 
 368. See Mazo & Kuhner, supra note 101, at 6–7. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, in DEMOCRACY BY THE 
PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 78–80 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. 
Kuhner eds., 2018); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPT 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 15–20 (2011) (introducing the concept of “dependence corrup-
tion” and explaining how Congress becomes drawn to the interests of donors rather than focusing 
“on the people alone”); see generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance 
Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2015). 
 371.  See Mazo & Kuhner, supra note 101, at 7. 
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whether the donor is located within the state or outside of it.  The tables in 
the Appendix summarize these contribution limits for all 50 states.  For in-
stance, only 11 states allow unlimited contributions to be made to candidates 
who run in their gubernatorial races.  In addition, 22 states ban corporations 
from making direct contributions to any state candidate, and another 18 
states ban unions from doing so as well (see Appendix, Table 3). 
Though these contribution limits differ from state to state, this form of 
campaign finance federalism is “weak” because it cannot prevent out-of-
state individuals or entities from contributing to state candidates.  Nor can it 
prevent these candidates from soliciting campaign contributions from out-
side of their districts.  In short, because the state contribution limits apply 
equally to all donors across the country, they prevent the states from devel-
oping truly unique political communities that are supported only by their cit-
izens.  A state’s unique contribution limit will also be ripe for challenge 
when it is made too low, although some low limits have been upheld.372  
And all state expenditure limits will be held unconstitutional. 
 
V. THE DEATH OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE NATIONALISM 
A. Foreign Participation in American Elections 
This Article has argued thus far that our political system is characterized 
by its “campaign finance nationalism.”  We have used this term to draw a 
picture of a political system in which the funding of campaigns at the feder-
al, state, and local level is national in scope, despite the fact that voting is 
not.  Everyone is free to donate to a candidate across state lines, although 
only a resident of the candidate’s district can cast a vote for him.  One con-
sequence of our campaign finance nationalism is that state governments are 
unable to prevent out-of-state contributors from influencing their local poli-
tics.  Another is that our politicians, regardless of the level of government at 
which they serve, are forced to fundraise all over the country.  The more ex-
 
 372. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding a $1,075 Mis-
souri state limit on contributions to state candidates made by political action committees).  But see 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (striking down a $400 Vermont state limit that restricts what 
politics parties could give to all statewide candidates as too low); see also Anthony J. Gaughan, The 
Futility of Contributions Limits in the Age of Super PACs, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 755, 764–65 (2012) 
(noting the relatively low limits many states set for both in-state and out-of-state contributions). 
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pensive the campaign, the wider one’s fundraising net must be cast.   
At the same time, given the mandate of Section 441e and the decision in 
Bluman, our political funding system was designed to prevent “campaign 
finance internationalism” from taking root.  The American campaign finance 
system, in other words, was not designed to be global.  American citizens, 
permanent residents, and domestic corporations and unions can all partici-
pate in the system; foreign nationals cannot.  But to what extent does our 
campaign finance system preserve its nationalism successfully? 
Throughout the history of the United States, foreign actors have consist-
ently tried to influence American elections.  One way they have done this by 
assisting American political candidates.  Foreigners wish to give money to 
candidates in the hope of swaying their decision-making once they become 
officeholders, in the same way domestic contributors do.  Though our cur-
rent campaign finance system is designed to prevent foreign interference, it 
often works poorly at doing so.  Russia’s electoral interference during the 
presidential election of 2016 is one example, but it is not the only one. Rich-
ard Nixon’s $10 million in foreign contributions during the 1972 presidential 
race—which served in part as the impetus for the ban on foreign contribu-
tions and expenditures found in Section 441e—is another example.   
In the 1990s, foreign governments tried to influence U.S. policy by giv-
ing money to political parties instead of candidates.  In 1996, large contribu-
tions by foreign nationals with ties to Asia flowed to the Democratic Nation-
al Committee (DNC), causing a scandal and prompting the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs to conduct an investigation.  As a result 
of this, Congress banned soft money contributions in federal elections when 
it amended Section 441e at the same time as it passed the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act in 2002. The law at that point forbade foreign nationals 
from making contributions to political parties.  FEC regulations then barred 
foreign nationals from influencing how unions, corporations, party commit-
tees, or political committees participate in American campaigns.373 
At that point, the only way foreign money could make its way into do-
mestic campaigns was through the U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign corpo-
rations.  This exception existed because the FEC had controversially inter-
preted Section 441e to allow U.S.-based subsidiaries to make contributions 
to candidates through political action committees.374  Despite the fact that 
 
 373. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2004).  
 374.  See Powell, supra note 149, at 964.  
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the subsidiary was foreign-controlled, it was not considered a “foreign na-
tional” as long as it was incorporated and had its principle place of business 
in the United States.375  There were important restrictions imposed by the 
FEC on PAC contributions made by these subsidiaries.  Foreign nationals 
could not participate in the activities of the subsidiary’s PAC.376  Any for-
eign national who sat on the subsidiary’s board had to abstain from voting 
on any issues related to its PAC.377  The subsidiary also had to produce real 
income in the United States to fund its PAC.378 And foreign nationals could 
not contribute any of their own money to the subsidiary’s PAC.379   
Despite these restrictions, the amount of contributions made to candi-
dates by PACs belonging to the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations be-
gan increasing.  This increase in contributions continues today.  In 2018, a 
record 238 PACs belonging to the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations 
supported political candidates across the United States,380 contributing more 
than $23.5 million to American electoral campaigns in total.381  That is more 
than such PACs had ever contributed in prior years.  These PAC contribu-
tions are not the only threat, however, to our campaign finance nationalism.  
After Citizens United was decided, another threat became the ability of these 
U.S.-based subsidiaries to make unlimited independent expenditures.  This 
was the issue that Justice Stevens repeatedly raised in his dissent.382   
Soon after Citizens United struck down the ban prohibiting corporations 
from making independent expenditures to influence elections, a case decided 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Speechnow.org v. FEC,383 
 
 375.  See FEC Advisory Op. 1992-16 (June 26, 1992), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1992-
16/1992-16.pdf. See also 22 U.S.C. §611(b).  
 376.  See Powell, supra note 149, at 965. 
 377.  Id. at 965–66; see also FEC Advisory Op. 1995-15 (June 30, 1995), 
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1995-15/1995-15.pdf.  
 378. See  FEC Advisory Op. 1995-15 (June 30, 1995), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1995-
15/1995-15.pdf. 
 379.  Powell, supra note 149, at 965; see also FEC Advisory Op. 1989-20 (October 27, 1989), 
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1989-20/1989-20.p 
 380. Foreign-Connected PACs: Election Cycle 2018, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/foreign.php (last visited May 27, 2019). 
 381.  Id. 
 382.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens J., dissenting) (warning 
that “[u]nlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled”); id at 405 n.12 (dis-
puting the majority’s view that corporations have the same rights to the First Amendment as individ-
uals and that “domestic corporations have a claim better than foreign corporations”).  
 383.  599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
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held that it was unconstitutional to apply contribution limits to PACs that 
made only independent expenditures.384  Overnight, the phenomenon of the 
Super PAC was born.385  Super PACs are committees that spend money on 
elections but not do contribute to candidates.  Since they do not, technically, 
make contributions, there is no one for them to “corrupt.” As such, Super 
PACs are able to raise unlimited sums, regardless of whether it is given to 
them by individuals or corporations, and to spend unlimited sums.  
Citizens United and Speechnow.org together provided an avenue for the 
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations to contribute millions of dollars to 
Super PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations.  501(c)(4) organizations are social 
welfare organizations that are regulated by the IRS, not the FEC.  As men-
tioned earlier, a 501(c)(4) does not have to disclose its donors.  After Citi-
zens United, the political activities of a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corpora-
tion, like the political activities of any other U.S.-based corporation, were no 
longer restricted to making contributions to candidates through PACs.  Now 
the same subsidiary was also free to spend its money on advertisements pur-
chased through its own independent expenditures, as well as to contribute to 
outside spending groups like Super PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations.  In 
recent years, many subsidiaries have started playing this game.386 
Technically, foreign nationals are not allowed to direct these payments.  
But it is also the case that foreign companies have a great deal of influence 
over their U.S. subsidiaries, even if that influence is indirect.  Those who run 
the U.S subsidiary are naturally very sensitive to the wishes and desires of 
their foreign overseers.  For years, the FEC has been at odds over how to 
regulate the political activities of these subsidiaries.  Meanwhile, dozens of 
these subsidiaries have recently been giving to outside spending groups to 
influence U.S. elections.  For instance, in 2017, British American Tobacco, 
based in the United Kingdom, acquired Reynolds American, Inc.  Shortly 
thereafter, Reynolds American ramped up its political giving, contributing 
 
 384.  Id. 
 385.  See Corey R. Sparks, Foreigners United: Foreign Influence in American Elections After Citi-
zens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 245, 250 (2014). 
 386. See CLC Complaint Leads to Record Fines for Foreign Interference in Presidential Election, 
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-complaint-leads-
record-fines-foreign-interference-presidential-election; Karl Evers-Hillstrom & Raymond Arke, Fol-
lowing Citizens United, foreign-owned corporations funnel millions into US elections, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/03/citizens-united-
foreign-owned-corporations-put-millions-in-us-elections/.  
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$1.2 million to Super PACs in 2018.387  In 2018, the FEC hit Right to Rise, 
another Super PAC, which had supported Jed Bush in 2016, with a large fine 
for soliciting $1.3 million in contributions during the presidential primaries 
from a U.S.-based subsidiary, American Pacific International Capital 
(APIC), that was owned by Chinese nationals.388  APIC had also earlier con-
tributed to a liberal Super PAC that supported Hillary Clinton.389 
Complaints have been filed to get courts and the FEC to police this kind 
of activity, but it is not clear that the FEC’s fines are effective.  As Professor 
Michael Gilbert explains, “In exchange for a $1.3 million contribution, the 
super PAC paid a $390,000 fine.  The difference—$910,000 in illegal mon-
ey—is the super PAC’s to keep.”390  Even the time lag of FEC’s enforce-
ment action is revealing.  The illegal foreign contributions to Right to Rise 
were given in 2015, whereas the FEC announced its fines in 2019, or four 
years later.391  By that time, the election these illegal contributions were 
meant to influence was over.  Because the benefit of violating the law ex-
ceeds the penalty, it encourages such violations.  “The regulation of political 
expenditures by foreign corporations,” as another scholar explains, “is the 
800-pound gorilla that the Supreme Court has never confronted.”392 
The independent expenditures of the American subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations are not totally free from regulation.  For instance, the subsidiary 
is only supposed to use money earned in the United States for its political 
activities,393 and the foreign parent cannot replenish any of its funds.394  The 
problem with enforcing such regulations is that often the subsidiary’s dona-
tions remain undisclosed.  As mentioned, making contributions to 501(c)(4) 
organizations, which do not have to disclose their donors, offers foreign na-
tionals a way to hide their activities from American voters and law enforce-
ment officials.  It is impossible to know whether foreign citizens, foreign 
 
 387.  Hillstrom & Arke, supra note 386. 
 388.  See Anna Massoglia & Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Chinese-owned company that gave illegal $1.3 
million to Jeb Bush super PAC also gave to pro-Clinton groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (March 
12, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/03/chinese-owned-company-gave-illegal-1-3-
million-to-jeb-bush-super-pac/. 
 389.  Id. 
 390.  See Michael D. Gilbert & Samir Sheth, For Campaign Finance Violators, Crime Pays, TAKE 
CARE BLOG (April 24, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/for-campaign-finance-violators-crime-
pays (explaining how the Right to Rise Super PAC, despite its fine, still came out ahead). 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Vega, supra note 133, at 992. 
 393.  Id. at 977. 
 394.  Id. at 978. 
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corporations, or foreign governments use such dark money for secret spend-
ing in American elections.  A foreign national can give money to a 501(c)(4) 
organization without the 501(c)(4) organization ever disclosing the contribu-
tion.  In turn, the 501(c)(4) organization can give that money to a Super 
PAC.  Finally, the Super PAC can spend the money on TV advertisements to 
influence what voters think of a particular candidate.  If the original contri-
bution comes from a foreign source, there is no way for the public to know.  
Investigations have revealed these groups accepting at least some money 
linked to foreign governments.395  The lack of transparency makes it difficult 
to find out if these funds are being used to influence elections.396 
Even if we manage to find a way to close the loopholes available to for-
eign corporations, there is still the issue of how foreign governments can be 
prevented from influencing American elections.  The leading narrative con-
cerning the 2016 presidential contest involved just such a scenario.397  Rus-
sia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election exposed cracks in the se-
curity of America’s democratic infrastructure, exposing some of its most 
vulnerable weaknesses.  Hackers working on behalf of the Russian govern-
ment targeted multiple state voter registration databases and managed to 
gain access to the election machinery of a number of states.398  In addition to 
 
 395.  See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Watchdog Group Files Complaint Over Donation to Trump Super PAC 
by Canadian Billionaire’s Company, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05 /21/us/politics/donation-trump-super-pac-canadian.html (docu-
menting allegations that Barry Zekelman, the chief executive of Zekelman Industries, a Canadian 
company that is North America’s largest steel tube manufacturer, made $1.75 million in donations to 
a Super PAC supporting Donald Turmp through a Chicago-based subsidiary); Jay Weaver et al., 
Feds Open Foreign-Money Investigation into Trump Donor Cindy Yang, MIAMI HERALD (May 12, 
2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article230217729.html (describing 
an FBI investigation into Republican donor and South Florida massage-parlor entrepreneur Li “Cin-
dy” Yang, who allegedly funneled money from China into Donald Trump’s re-election effort).  
 396.  See Ian Vandewalker & Lawrence Norden, Getting Foreign Funds Out of American Elec-
tions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 15 (2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Getting%20Foreign%20Funds%20Ou
t%20of%20America%27s%20Elections.%20Final_April9_0.pdf.  
 397.  See Anthony J. Gaughan, Putin’s Revenge: The Foreign Threat to American Campaign Fi-
nance Law, 62 HOWARD L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript on file with author) (explaining the 
stages of Russia’s influence campaign during the 2016 American presidential election).  
 398.  Ellen Nakashima & Karoun Demirjian, Russian Government Hackers Targeted Small County 
in Florida Panhandle in 2016, WASH. POST (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/floridas-house-members-demand-changes-
to-disclosure-rules-on-election-hacking/2019/05/16/8e039672-77f8-11e9-bd25-
c989555e7766_story.html (explaining how the voter registration database of a small county in the 
Florida panhandle was breached by Russian government hackers in 2016). 
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potentially manipulating America’s democratic infrastructure, Russia’s ac-
tions also revealed a new type of threat: foreign interference orchestrated by 
another government through targeted and misleading advertisements placed 
on social media platforms.  The use of Facebook and other social media by 
Russian bots exposed cracks in our campaign finance nationalism.399   
 One of those cracks is that the regulatory scheme underpinning our 
campaign finance system does not apply to issue advocacy, meaning that 
foreigners are free to spend money to influence elections as long as they re-
frain from expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate by 
name and do so outside the electioneering communications window.  We 
have Bluman to thank for this.  The court in Bluman specifically held that 
Section 441e does not bar foreign nationals from “issue advocacy—that is, 
speech that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a specific 
candidate.”400  The court emphasized how Section 441e “does not restrain 
foreign nationals from speaking about issues or spending money to advocate 
views about issues.”401  Instead, Section 441e “restrains them only from a 
certain form of expressive activity closely tied to the voting process—
providing money for a candidate or political party or spending money in or-
der to expressly advocate for or against the election of a candidate.”402  
This means that foreigners are free to speak about political issues in the 
United States—and to spend money to advocate for such issues—as long as 
they do not expressly urge the election or defeat of a candidate and speak 
outside the statutory window regulating electioneering communications.  In 
other words, if the Russian government buys a broadcast advertisement that 
does not call for the election of any particular candidate, it appears that the 
Kremlin, using its vast wealth, would be on firm legal ground in attacking 
Hillary Clinton, as long as its ad runs more than 60 days before a general 
election or 30 days before a primary.403  Benjamin Bluman, a Canadian citi-
 
 399.  See Gaughan, supra note 397. 
 400.  Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 284 (2011).  Following Wisconsin Right to Life v. 
FEC, 551 U.S. 449, 456 (2007), the Bluman court defined “express advocacy” as expenditures made 
to fund “express campaign speech” or its “functional equivalent.”  Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 284.  
An ad is the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy if it “is susceptible of no reasonable inter-
pretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”  Id. at 285. 
 401.  Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
 402.  Id. 
 403.  Fred Wertheimer, Loopholes Allow Foreign Adversaries to Legally Interfere in U.S. Elec-
tions, JUST SECURITY (May 28, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64324/loopholes-allow-foreign-
adversaries-to-legally-interfere-in-u-s-elections/. 
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zen, would also be free to print and distribute flyers in Central Park, if all 
these flyers did was mention the benefits of free trade, the harms of smok-
ing, or the emotional pain of getting an abortion, all without urging that any 
candidate be elected.  The section of Bluman holding that Section 441e’s ban 
on foreign spending only applies to express advocacy has gone largely unno-
ticed by commentators who have written about the opinion,404  even though 
the court clearly explained it had to read Section 441e this way because of 
an earlier Roberts Court decision, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC,405 which 
had defined issue advocacy narrowly.406  Unfortunately, the issue advocacy 
loophole promises to become the exception that swallows the rule. 
Foreign money spent on issue advocacy is not even the last loophole in 
our campaign finance nationalism.  Another is that the ban on foreign spend-
ing only applies to willful violations of the law.  The Bluman court stated 
how seeking criminal penalties for violations of Section 441e, “which re-
quires that the defendant acted ‘willfully’ . . . will require proof of the de-
fendant’s knowledge of the law.”407  As the court surmised further, there 
may be “many aliens in this country who no doubt are unaware of the statu-
tory ban on foreign expenditures, in particular.”408  Most foreigners do not 
know the law applies to them, which may absolve them of liability.   
Finally, it remains unclear whether the ban of foreign spending in Amer-
ican elections applies to ballot measures.  This is again an issue of concern. 
In 2015, the FEC deadlocked in an enforcement action concerning whether 
the ban on foreign nationals related to ballot initiatives.  In that case, a Lux-
embourg-based company and a domestic subsidiary contributed money to 
oppose a Los Angeles ballot initiative.409  The FEC could not resolve the is-
sue, and thus created another loophole that provides a legal means for for-
eign nationals to be able to influence American elections. 
 
 404.  See Richard Hasen, Why Banning Russian Facebook Ads Might Be Impossible, POLITICO 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/26/russian-facebook-ads-
regulation-215647 (explaining how “in a part of Bluman that has not been much noticed, the three-
judge court construed the statute barring foreign election spending to apply only to express advocacy 
(‘Vote for Obama’), not to issue advocacy (‘Tell Hillary to show us her emails’)”). 
 405.  551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 406.  Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 290 (2011) (explaining how the “district court held it 
had to read the statute this way thanks to another Roberts Court opinion, which held that reading the 
issue advocacy test broadly would violate the First Amendment”). 
 407.  Id. at 292. 
 408.  Id. 
 409.  See R. Sam Garrett, Foreign Money and U.S. Campaign Finance Policy, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 
(March 25, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10697.pdf. 
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B. Closing the Door to Foreign Participation 
To the extent that our system of campaign finance nationalism should 
continue to function as it had before, what can be done to preserve it?  
Scholars, citizens, and legislators have suggested three remedies that would 
work to prevent foreign nationals from influencing American elections. 
They involve overruling Citizens United judicially, ratifying a constitutional 
amendment to overrule that decision constitutionally, or having Congress 
pass new laws to prevent foreign spending in American elections legislative-
ly.  So far, none of these options have been implemented successfully.   
Prior to the election of Donald Trump in 2016, many activists had called 
for Citizens United to be overruled.  The Supreme Court has overruled cases 
in the past—Citizens United itself, in fact, overturned two prior Supreme 
Court decisions in the area of campaign finance law.410  Certainly, the 
Court’s liberal justices were in favor.  A number of them stated as much in 
their public appearances and judicial pronouncements.411  Before the 2016 
presidential election, several scholars also advanced the idea of overruling 
Citizens United as the best path to achieving campaign finance reform.412  
This movement rested on the assumption that Hillary Clinton would win the 
presidency; the thought was that if she could nominate a liberal Justice to 
replace Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy when they retired, that Justice 
would provide a narrow 5–4 path for Citizens United to be scrapped.413 
 
 410.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (overruling Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), a case that allowed the government to prohibit the independ-
ent expenditures of corporations, and parts of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), a case that had 
upheld Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which prevented corporations from 
using their general treasury funds to finance express advocacy expenditures). 
 411. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 518 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Were the matter up to me, I would vote to grant the petition for certiorari in order to reconsider 
Citizens United . . . .”); Tara Golshan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg says her “impossible dream” is for Citi-
zens United to be overturned, VOX (July 11, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/7/11/12148066/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-citizens-united; Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Cri-
tiques Latest Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-of-donald-trump-
critiques-latest-term.html (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg as saying, “It won’t happen.  It would be an 
impossible dream.  But I’d love to see Citizens United overruled.”). 
 412.  See Richard L.. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 35 (2014) (explaining how the key to cam-
paign finance reform “is to lay the groundwork for the Supreme Court to reserve Citizens United”).  
 413.  See id. (explaining how “[t]here will come a time in the not too distance future when Justice 
Scalia and Justice Kennedy will leave the Court, and if a democratic president appoints their succes-
sors, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence could turn back 180 degrees . . . .”). 
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But Hillary Clinton lost the presidency—in part, ironically enough, be-
cause of foreign interference.414  After her defeat, Donald Trump nominated 
Judge Neil Gorsuch of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to fill 
Justice Scalia’s old seat after Scalia’s death; he then nominated Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeal for the D.C. Circuit to replace the 
retiring Justice Kennedy.  Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation returned the Su-
preme Court to its former conservative majority and ensured that the path to 
overturning Citizens United would be closed for the foreseeable future.415 
Since Judge Kavanaugh was the author of the opinion in Bluman, his con-
firmation to the Supreme Court also solidified Bluman’s reasoning for bar-
ring foreign nationals from participating in American elections. 
Activists had no choice but to pivot to another strategy, and some sought 
to amend the Constitution.  There is precedent for using the amendment pro-
cess to overturn unpopular Supreme Court rulings.  In total, the Constitution 
has been amended 27 times.  The first ten of these amendments comprise the 
Bill of Rights.  Of the seventeen amendments that were ratified after the Bill 
of Rights, seven were passed to overturn specific Supreme Court deci-
sions.416  A dozen distinct amendment bills circulated through Congress as 
the movement overturn Citizens United began gathering steam.417  After ex-
tensive collaboration between the House and Senate sponsors of these bills 
and input from grassroots advocacy organizations such as Public Citizen, 
People for the American Way, Free Speech For People, and Common Cause, 
the backers of an amendment in Congress coalesced around a consensus text 
known as the Democracy For All Amendment (DFAA).  It has been intro-
duced in Congress several times, most recently in 2019.418 
The text of the DFAA consists of three sections.  Section 1 is designed 
to ensure democratic self-government by allowing Congress and the States 
to “regulate and set reasonable limits on the raising and spending of money 
 
 414.  See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 221–24 (2017). 
 415.  See Mazo & Kuhner, supra note 101, at 12.  
 416.  See Ronald A. Fein, Fixing the Supreme Court’s Mistake: The Case for the Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 385 
(Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018).  
 417.  Id. at 386.  
 418.  See H.R.J. RES. 2, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
joint-resolution/2/text.  In the 116th Congress, the text of the DCAA was jointly sponsored by law-
makers across the political aisle, including Representatives Ted Deutsch (D-FL), Jim McGovern (D-
MA), Jamie Raskin (D-MD), and John Katko (R-NY), as well as Senators Tom Udall (D-NM) and 
Michael Bennett (D-CO). 
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by candidates and others to influence elections.”419  This provision is specifi-
cally aimed at dislodging the regulation of campaign finance from the First 
Amendment protections that it currently enjoys. Section 2 of the DFAA gives 
Congress and the states the power to enforce the amendment “by appropriate 
legislation,” and also the power “to distinguish between natural persons and cor-
porations or other artificial entities created by law, including by prohibiting such 
entities from spending money to influence elections.”420  The language of Sec-
tion 2 is particularly important for closing the loopholes that allow foreign 
spending by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations.  Finally, Section 3 
consists of a savings clause that provides that nothing in the amendment “shall 
be construed to abridge the freedom of the press.”421  As Ron Fein and other ad-
vocates of the DFAA have explained, the amendment’s provisions aim to over-
turn key tenets not only of Citizens United, but also of Buckley.422 
The DFAA is one among many vehicles for accomplishing this goal that 
has been proposed in Congress.  For example, the We the People Amendment, 
put forth by the group Move to Amend (MTA), proposes slightly different 
amendment language.423  Other language has also been introduced to circum-
vent Citizens United.  Indeed, thirteen different campaign finance-related 
amendment bills were introduced in the 114th Congress (2014-2016), eleven 
in the 115th Congress (2016-2018), and, as of this writing, six in the 116th 
Congress (2018-2020).424  Most of these bills are not targeted at foreign na-
tionals and do not seek to preserve our campaign finance nationalism specif-
ically.  Rather, they aim to allow the government to set limits on contribu-
tions and expenditures, and especially to restrict corporate expenditures.  
Banning corporate expenditures would close the loophole that currently al-
lows foreign corporations to influence American elections. 
 
 419.  Section 1 of the DFAA says: “To advance democratic self-government and political equality, 
and to protect the integrity of government and the electoral process, Congress and the States may 
regulate and set reasonable limits on the raising and spending of money by candidates and others to 
influence elections.”  See H.R.J. RES. 2 § 1.  
 420.  H.R.J. RES. 2 § 2.  Section 2 of the DFAA says: “Congress and the States shall have power to 
implement and enforce this article by appropriate legislation, and may distinguish between natural 
persons and corporations or other artificial entities created by law, including by prohibiting such 
entities from spending money to influence elections.”  Id. 
 421.  H.R.J. RES. 2 § 3.  
 422.  See Fein, supra note 416, at 384–88. 
 423.  See H.R.J. Res. 48, 115th Congress (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-joint-resolution/48?r=6.  
 424.  See Constitutional Amendments, UNITED FOR THE PEOPLE, 
http://united4thepeople.org/amendments/ (last visited June 1, 2019). 
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Ratifying a constitutional amendment is a difficult endeavor.  The Con-
stitution provides two avenues for amendment.  The first requires the affir-
mation of two-thirds of each house of Congress (290 votes of the 435-
member House and 67 votes of the 100-member Senate), followed by ratifi-
cation of three-fourths of the states (38 states).425  The second method, which 
has never been used, requires a constitutional convention to be convened af-
ter two-thirds of the state legislatures (34 in total) call for it.  This conven-
tion can propose an amendment, which then must be ratified by three-fourths 
of the states, as with the first method.426  Most reformers today are not look-
ing to begin with Congress, but, as Ronald Fein explains, to take a “bottom-
up, state-by-state, grassroots-orientated approach,” one that starts at the state 
level.427  Amendment activists believe in putting pressure on state legisla-
tures to act first, in order to put pressure on Congress later.  
Regardless of which amendment strategy is pursued, it would at best 
amount to an indirect method of regulating foreign nationals.  Indeed, a con-
stitutional amendment, even if it were to ban corporations from spending 
money to influence American elections, would not close other loopholes in 
the system.  The issue advocacy loophole, for example, would remain.  For 
this reason, as well as because an amendment is difficult to ratify, members 
of Congress have tried to address the problems posed by foreigner nationals 
in our campaign finance system in other ways as well.  One of these is by 
introducing ordinary legislation directly aimed at foreign activity. 
Back in 2010, the House of Representatives introduced the DISCLOSE 
Act.428  It sought to prohibit foreign interference in American elections by 
extending the ban on contributions and expenditures currently in place for 
foreign nationals to the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations.429  The 
DISCLOSE Act would have required the highest ranking official of a U.S. 
subsidiary, before making an contribution, independent expenditure, or dis-
bursement for an electioneering communication, to file a certificate with the 
FEC affirming that the subsidiary was not carrying out prohibited activity.430  
 
 425.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 426.  Id. 
 427.  See Fein, supra note 416, at 395–96; see also Sparks, supra note 385, at 264.   
 428.  Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act, 
H.R. Res. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-
bill/5175t. 
 429.  H.R. Res. 5175 § 102. 
 430.  H.R. Res. 5175 § 102(b). 
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The act would also have made these U.S. subsidiaries ineligible to contribute 
to campaigns through PACs or to make independent expenditures if more 
than 5% of their voting shares were controlled by a foreign government, a 
foreign government official, a corporation owned by a foreign government 
or foreign officials, or by multiple foreign citizens.431 
The DISCLOSE Act passed through the House in June 2010, but it 
failed in the Senate.432  Two years later, in 2012, it was briefly revived, this 
time by several Senators, as the DISCLOSE Act of 2012, or what some 
commentators affectionately called the “DISCLOSE Act 2.0.”433  This time 
the bill did not seek to regulate the activities of foreign nationals directly, 
but instead aimed to deter corporate spending on electioneering.  However, 
Republicans opposed the new measure, arguing that the proposals violated 
the First Amendment.  Subsequent efforts in Congress have been made to 
introduce similar legislation.  In 2018, Democrats introduced the 
DISCLOSE Act of 2018, a bill co-sponsored by 173 members of the House. 
It sought to apply the ban on contributions and expenditures to domestic 
corporations that are foreign-controlled, foreign-influenced, or foreign-
owned.434  Even more recently, after winning a majority of the House in the 
mid-term election of 2018, Democrats introduced a sweeping reform bill 
called For the People Act of 2019, more commonly known as H.R. 1.435  
This bill targeted foreign activity in American elections by prohibiting for-
eign nationals from directing, controlling, or participating in the decision-
making process of any corporation, labor union, political committee, or po-
litical organization with regard to election activity.436  The bill would also 
require the FEC to conduct an audit after each election to determine the in-
fluence of illicit foreign activity that took place,437 prohibit foreign nationals 
 
 431.  H.R. Res. 5175 § 102(a)(3). 
 432.  The vote in the House of Representatives in favor of the bill was 219–206.  However, the 
Senate failed to achieve cloture and the bill failed there.  See S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010); see also 
Vega, supra note 133, at 908 n.179; Sparks, supra note 385, at 260.  
 433.  See S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-
bill/3369; see also Sparks, supra note 385, at 260 (describing how this legislation “was revived in 
2012 as the so-called “DISCLOSE Act 2.0’”). 
 434.  See H.R. 6239, 115th Cong. §101 (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/6239/text. 
 435.  H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1/text 
#toc-H5BBCCF14A5164742BC545908842F26B7 
 436.  H.R. 1 § 4101(a)(3). 
 437.  H.R. 1 § 4103. 
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from making contributions to influence the outcome of ballot initiatives and 
referenda,438 and prohibit foreign nationals from making contributions, ex-
penditures, independent expenditures, or disbursements for electioneering 
communications for online advertising.439 
Other ideas have been proposed as well. For instance, the so-called 
Honest Ad Act, introduced in the Senate, would regulate online political ad-
vertisements that Americans encounter on platforms like Facebook and 
Google.440  The Honest Ads Act is designed to improve the disclosure re-
quirements for such online advertisements by amending the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act’s definition of an electioneering communication to cover 
paid Internet and digital advertisements.  The Honest Ads Act would require 
digital platforms with at least 50 million monthly viewers to maintain a pub-
lic file of all electioneering communications purchased by a person or group 
that spends more than $500 on ads published on such platforms, and it 
would require these persons and groups to disclose who paid for these ads.441  
The act would also require online platforms to make a concerted effort to en-
sure that foreign nationals are not using their technology to purchase politi-
cal advertisements meant to influence the American electorate.442   
In a similar vein, the PAID Ads Act, introduced in April 2019, would 
add political advertising to the list of prohibited activities for foreign nation-
als,443 regulating paid internet or digital communications that refer to a clear-
ly identified candidate for office and are disseminated within 60 days of a 
general federal election or within 30 days of a primary in the same way as 
electioneering communications.444  The PAID Ads Act would also prohibit 
foreign nationals from buying broadcast or internet ads that promote, attack, 
support or oppose a candidate, regardless of whether the ads engage in ex-
press advocacy.445  Finally, PAID Ads Act would prohibit spending by for-
eign governments for broadcast and internet ads that discuss national legisla-
tive issues of public importance during a federal election year, even if those 
 
 438.  H.R. 1 § 4104. 
 439.  H.R. 1 § 4105. 
 440.  See S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/1989/actions.  
 441.  S. 1989 8(a). 
 442. Id. 
 443.  See Preventing Adversaries Internationally from Disbursing Advertising Dollars (PAID Ads) 
Act, H.R. 2135, 116th Cong., §2 (2019), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr2135/text. 
 444.  H.R. 2135 § 4(a)(2)(F). 
 445. H.R. 2135 § 4(a)(2)(H). 
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ads do not mention the specific name of a candidate.  The legislation is de-
signed to prohibit the types of ads run by Russia in the 2016 election. 
Other proposed legislation seeks to amend FECA to require additional 
verification for online credit card contributions, to prohibit U.S. companies 
with a certain percentage of foreign ownership from making independent 
expenditures or campaign contributions to candidates through PACs, to re-
quire tax-exempt organizations to certify that they do not accept or use for-
eign funds in regard to U.S. elections, and to prohibit foreign nationals from 
making contributions or expenditures in state and local ballot initiatives and 
referenda.446  The problem with all of this proposed legislation, much like 
that which has already been introduced in Congress, is that our political par-
ties do not agree on it.  The Democratic majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives favors most of these initiatives, while the Republican-led Senate 
does not.  Thus, our campaign finance nationalism continues, albeit with the 
porous holes that grant foreign actors some entry into the system.  The Su-
preme Court, meanwhile, has avoided wading into these waters. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Does our campaign finance nationalism make sense? This remains an 
open question, and scholars have been divided in answering it.  Justice John 
Paul Stevens, before his death, had opposed the idea that people and entities 
should be able to influence a particular candidate’s election even though 
they could not vote for him.  In a 2014 book, Stevens explained how “it is 
unwise to allow persons who are not qualified to vote—whether they be cor-
porations or nonresident individuals—to have a potentially greater power to 
affect the outcome of elections than eligible voters have.”447  In a system of 
campaign finance nationalism, corporations and nonresidents are given that 
power, and the evidence suggests that they wield it with increasing frequen-
cy and effectiveness.  Whether they deserve that power, however, depends 
on one’s theory of representation in a federal system.448 
Scholars like Todd Pettys and Jessica Bulman-Pozen celebrate the fact 
that our campaign finance system allows political engagement across state 
 
 446.  See Garrett, supra note 409, at 2. 
 447.  JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE 
CONSTITUTION 59 (2014).  
 448.  See Pettys, supra note 225, at 81.  
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lines.449  These scholars view cross-border political activity as complimen-
tary to American federalism.450  They argue that our campaign finance sys-
tem brings a national agenda to local contests and suits a mobile elec-
torate.451 For them, there is no tension between voting rights federalism and 
campaign finance nationalism. The speaker-neutrality mandate of Citizens 
United easily co-exists with the decision in Bluman because foreigners fall 
into a different category, as people who do not warrant the protections of the 
First Amendment.  Most Americans probably subscribe to this view too, 
without really thinking about it.  Most Americans do not question why our 
politicians are allowed to seek their campaign contributions from nonresi-
dent donors, just as they do not question that most serious candidates for na-
tional office are supported by a Super PAC.  Most Americans view our cam-
paign finance nationalism as an integral part of our federal system. 
 Other scholars subscribe to a different theory of representation and dis-
approve of this state of affairs.  Those who fall into this camp do not believe 
that our campaign finance nationalism works to advance the ideals of demo-
cratic self-government.452  The First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech 
and freedom of association, this latter group of scholars believe, are not the 
only ideals that should be advanced by our campaign finance system.  When 
courts consider whether campaign finance laws are constitutional, they 
should consider the ideal of self-government, as fought for by the Framers, 
as an equally important value in need of protection.453 And just as the princi-
ple of democratic self-government can be used to restrict campaign contribu-
tions from foreigners, for many of these scholars it should also be used to 
restrict the contributions of nonresident Americans.454   
Bluman, of course, found resident and nonresident Americans to be 
members of the same political community. But whether they are part of the 
same political community or not depends on one’s theory of representation 
in a federal system.  For some, voting and influencing the vote that another 
individual may cast somewhere else are not separate enough activities that 
 
 449.  See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 364, at 1135.  
 450.  See Pettys, supra note 225, at 86. 
 451.  See Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481 502–03 (2004) (arguing that 
mobile Americans have an incentive to seek similar legislative policies regardless of where they 
live). 
 452.  Briffault, supra note 9, at 68. 
 453.  See Hellman, supra note 15, at 59–60, 66–77.  
 454.  Id. at 67. 
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they should be governed differently.  They are not separate enough that the 
first activity should be restricted to a state’s residents, while the second ac-
tivity should not be.  Before his death, Justice Stevens argued that our cam-
paign finance nationalism leads to “picking other people’s congressmen, not 
your own.”455  Evidently, the system does not make sense to everyone.  And 
to the chagrin of many, the Court has been reluctant to enter these waters.  
But the day may come when another foreign government decides to exploit 
our system, and the Court will then have no choice but to intervene. 
  
 
 455.  Id. at 78; Jeffrey Toobin, I Told You So, NEW YORKER (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/i-told-you-so-4. 
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APPENDIX 
The following tables present data on the contribution limits imposed by 
the states for individuals, political parties, political actions committees, cor-
porations, and unions that wish to donate to state candidates.  This data can 
be found in State Data on Contributions to Candidates: 2017–2018 Election 
Cycle, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 27, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Contribution_Limits_to
_Candidates_2017-2018_16465.pdf.  The contribution limits provided are 
those imposed for a state’s general election, not primary election.  The high-
est contribution limit is provided for each category.  In some states, for in-
stance, various kinds of PACs have different contribution limits, but these 
differences do not appear in this data.  In addition, this data does not consid-
er triggers that may affect the baseline limits or take into account limits im-
posed by voluntary restrictions, such as when a state candidate agrees to 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
